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A CONTEXTUALIZED ACCOUNT OF 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW± 
 
Michelle Biddulph * & Dwight Newman * * 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines general principles of international 
law through the innovative means of comparing their use in 
four different, novel areas of international law—international 
environmental law, international investment law, international 
criminal law, and international indigenous rights.  By doing so, 
the Article is able to make the distinct claim that there is no 
one, single methodology for analysis of general principles of in-
ternational law.  Rather, each area of international law tends 
to use a methodology suited to its policy objectives and overall 
characteristics as a specific area of law.  The Article character-
izes two predominant academic approaches to general princi-
ples: a purely “domestic approach” and a “hybrid approach”.  
The Article argues that international environmental law has 
tended to use a hybrid approach, whereas international in-	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vestment law has limited itself to a domestic approach, mani-
festing immediately the differentiated analysis in different ar-
eas.  International criminal law and international law on in-
digenous rights manifest more mixed approaches to analysis, 
again based on the needs of these different areas.  These areas, 
however, also manifest some criticisms of the use of general 
principles that have led sometimes to restraints on them in the 
service of policy needs of different areas of international law.  
The Article ultimately puts the novel argument that this con-
textual analysis is not simply descriptively accurate but is a 
manifestation of an appropriate contextually-differentiated de-
velopment of international law in light of concerns for its legit-
imacy in regulating actors other than state entities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Understandings on the sources of international law are in 
significant flux. Some have argued for meaningfully different  
approaches to customary international law.1  Others have 
raised deeper theoretical questions about the sources of inter-
national law.2  Yet others worry about the debate’s movement 
away from traditional approaches.3  Amid the debate, the 
source contained within section 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice,4 “the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations”,5 does not always receive as 
much attention as other sources, although others see it as hav-
ing enormous potential, albeit of different sorts.   
Certain traditionalists say that the evolving debate on the 
elements of customary international law has now created such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  See e.g., ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1971) (more traditional statement on customary international law); A. 
Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001) (overview of shifting terrain of the analysis 
of customary international law); BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS (2010) (ar-
guing for significantly modified approach). 
2  See e.g., Samantha Besson, Theorizing the Sources of International 
Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Samantha Besson & John 
Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
3  See e.g., Anthony D’Amato, New Approaches to Customary Internation-
al Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 163 (2011). 
4 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.1(b) T.S. No. 993 
(1945). 
5  Id. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
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problematic consequences, particularly through neglect of ac-
tual state practice, that general principles of international law 
may actually be a preferable source for international lawyers to 
use so as to restore some element of rigour to the analysis.6  
Others see general principles as part of a broader constitution-
al dimension of the international legal order,7 although yet 
others then wonder if one is still speaking of “general princi-
ples” in the technical sense that amounts to a source of inter-
national law.8    
General principles are potentially a very different type of 
source of international law.  The International Court of Jus-
tice’s references to general principles have had, according to 
some authors, “a natural law overtone”.9  Yet the detailed ap-
plication of general principles is seldom examined.  This Article 
seeks to make a novel contribution to the understanding of 
general principles by surveying and analyzing their use in four 
different areas of international law, thereby contributing to 
their analysis an actual textured, comparative use across these 
areas—international environmental law, international invest-
ment law, international criminal law, and indigenous rights.  
Using this comparative analysis, the Article makes the distinc-
tive claim that there is not one specific approach to general 
principles in international law, but rather that there are con-
textually-differentiated approaches within specialized areas of 
international law that respond to the unique nature of each ar-
ea.   
Each of the four areas examined has featured significant 
recent use of general principles, perhaps because they are rela-
tively novel areas of international law doctrine, although this 
Article will also point to other factors.  At the same time, there 
is also the possibility that each of these areas has seen interna-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Cf. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. J. INT’L L. 82 (1988). 
7  See S. Kadelbach & T. Kleinlein, International Law–A Constitution for 
Mankind? An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional 
Principles, 50 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 340 (2007). 
8  Cf. Armin von Bogdandy, General Principles of International Public 
Authority: Sketching a Research Field, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1909 (2008). 
9  INGO VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW: ON 
SEMANTIC CHANGE AND NORMATIVE TWISTS 25 (2012) (referring inter alia to 
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (“gen-
eral and well-recognized principles [like] elementary considerations of hu-
manity”).). 
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tional adjudicative bodies identifying extant general principles 
in somewhat different ways. This Article will compare those 
methodologies and go on to offer some critique of them.  In do-
ing so, this Article seeks to make a significant contribution to 
the understanding of general principles through a more contex-
tual analysis than they are often given.  Indeed, one of the Ar-
ticle’s ultimate conclusions is that they may actually need to be 
understood contextually, with the possibility that international 
law actually has contextually-differentiated modes of for-
mation—as one of the Article’s authors has begun to argue 
elsewhere.10      
Part II of the Article traces the longer trajectory on the 
concept of general principles, from the drafting history on the 
concept to their use in the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and the International Court of Justice.  Thereafter, it 
categorizes the academic approaches to general principles, dif-
ferentiating those who argue that general principles are de-
rived from domestic legal systems and those who take a more 
hybrid approach.   
The first pairing of areas helps to show that different areas 
of international law can correspond more closely to one or the 
other of these academic approaches.  Part III traces the use of 
general principles in international environmental law, showing 
this area’s use of the hybrid approach.  Part IV traces the use 
of general principles in international investment law and 
shows its strict adherence to the domestic approach.  That the-
se two areas can take fundamentally different approaches to 
the methodology for general principles contributes to the Arti-
cle’s ultimate argument of the need for close contextual consid-
eration of the use of this source. 
The second pairing of areas of international law involves 
two areas that use mixed approaches in terms of their method-
ology and that thereby raise some critical questions about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  See Dwight Newman, Norms of Consultation with Indigenous Peoples: 
Decentralization of International Law Formation or Reinforcement of States’ 
Role?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NEW AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 267 (Andrew 
Byrnes, Mika Hayashi & Christopher Michaelsen eds., 2013).  See also, 
Dwight Newman, Legitimate Authority and Contextually-Differentiated 
Modes of Interpretation of International Law Norms, Presentation to Cam-
bridge Conference on Interpretation in International Law, Lauterpacht Cen-
tre for International Law, Cambridge University, Cambridge, U.K., (Aug. 
2013). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
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use of this source.  Part V traces the use of general principles 
in international criminal law, showing a period of intensive use 
of general principles, with some criticism and possible concerns 
about the methodology, followed by state desires to rein in their 
use, with new constraints imposed on them on a go-forward ba-
sis.  Part VI examines a recent, sudden use of general princi-
ples in an indigenous rights context and shows how it raises 
anew the questions about the relationship between customary 
international law and general principles.   
The concluding Part VII of the Article argues that this con-
textually rich analysis of general principles helps further an 
understanding of the concept in novel ways, with their use in 
different areas responding in some ways to needs in those are-
as and thus being contextually differentiated.  The Article ul-
timately suggests that there may not be a univocal concept of 
general principles but a broader spectrum of principles that en-
ter into international law in different ways.  At the same time, 
the potential that this contextually differentiated account 
means that different general principles could exist in different 
areas of international law, sometimes inconsistently, also ends 
up highlighting the possibility that the legitimacy understand-
ing of international law formation is incomplete in some areas 
of international law.  The close contextual analysis that this 
Article uniquely brings enables the identification of some high-
ly distinctive conclusions and some new understandings of gen-
eral principles. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES DEFINED  
While the formation of treaties and customary interna-
tional law has been fairly well-settled, no consensus has 
emerged on the correct methodology for identifying and apply-
ing a general principle of law on the international plane.11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) sets out the well-known defi-
nition of a treaty in Article 2: “an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied 
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever 
its particular designation”. The ICJ articulated the classic requirements for 
formulation of customary international law in its oft-quoted case of the North 
Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 
(Feb. 20): customary international law requires a “settled practice” of states 
combined with a belief that the practice is legally required (opinio juris sive 
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General principles do not arise solely from state action, like 
treaties or custom. They have been identified in the municipal 
systems of states,12 in the underpinnings of the international 
legal system as a whole,13 in natural law,14 as inchoate cus-
tom,15 in the tenets of legal logic,16 and in non-binding “soft 
law” instruments.17 As the discussion below indicates, no con-
sensus has emerged on what a general principle is nor on how 
it is formed, despite the frequent use of general principles in 
international jurisprudence. 
A. The Drafting of the Statute of the PCIJ  
When the drafters of the Statute of the PCIJ were debating 
the sources of law that the new court would apply, they agreed 
that general principles should be included as a source of law to 
avoid a non liquet situation—that is, a situation where no law 
applies.18 However, a divide emerged as to whether general 
principles as a source of international law should be derived 
from municipal law or from natural law. President Edward 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
necessitatis). States are the sole creators of both of these sources of interna-
tional law, at least in a general sense. 
12 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1970) (identifying general principles in international 
law as only those derived from municipal private law sources). 
13 See, e.g., GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY 
PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 107 (2012)  (referencing some general princi-
ples of law as the “foundational principles of the international community”—
for example, the principle of pacta sunt servanda).  
14 See, e.g., Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. 
Urug.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 52 (Apr. 20)  (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade) ; MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (6th ed., 2008) (referenc-
ing the arguments of some authors that general principles derive from natu-
ral law).   
15 Olufemi Elias and Chin Lim, General Principles of Law, Soft Law and 
the Identification of International Law, 28 NETH. Y.B. INT’L. L. 3, 35-37 
(1997).  
16 Hermann Mosler, General Principles of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 90 (vol. 7, 1984).  
17 See, e.g., the precautionary principle set out in Principle 15 in the 1992 
Rio Declaration on the Environment: Report of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, Annex I, GAOR, 47th Sess., UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Discussed fur-
ther in Part III, below.  
18 PCIJ/Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbeaux of the Proceed-
ings of the Committee (16 June – 24 July 1920) with Annexes 310-19 (1920), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/other-documents.php?p1=9&p2=8. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
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Descamps advocated for the naturalist approach, identifying 
general principles in the “legal conscience of civilized na-
tions”,19 derived from notions of “objective justice”.20 The Eng-
lish representative, Lord Phillimore, remained adamant that 
general principles of law are only those accepted by states in 
foro domestico and thus could only be derived from municipal 
law.21 The articulation in Article 38(3) of the Statute of the 
PCIJ (now Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ) was ac-
cepted as a compromise between these two positions.22  
 B. General Principles in the Majority Judgments of the 
PCIJ and ICJ 
Despite rarely mentioning Art. 38(3) of the Statute of the 
PCIJ or Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ, both world 
courts have engaged rather frequently with general principles 
of law. The PCIJ engaged with general principles in three ma-
jority decisions, while the ICJ has engaged with general princi-
ples of law in approximately twenty of its majority judgments, 
though only mentioning Article 38(1)(c) three times and never 
applying it.23 The principles that the PCIJ affirmed are: the 
general principle requiring states to respect the vested rights of 
foreigners in their territory,24 the duty to make reparations for 
a breach of a legal obligation,25 and the principle of diplomatic 
protection.26 The principles that the ICJ has affirmed include: 
the freedom of maritime communication,27 the prohibition on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Id. at 310-11. 
20 Id. at 323.  
21 Id. at 335.  
22 Id. at 344.  
23 These instances were: Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. 
Ind.), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 43 (Apr. 12); North Sea Continental Shelf case, supra 
note 4, at ¶ 17; and Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 127 (Mar. 31).  
24 Oscar Chinn (Brit. v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 87-88 
(Dec. 12).   
25 Chorzów Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Jul. 
26).  
26 Mavrommatis Palestinian Concessions (Greece v. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30).  
27 Corfu Channel , supra note 9, at 22 (describing Albania’s obligation to 
refrain from notifying Great Britain of mines in its waters as deriving from 
general principles rather than from the Hague Convention of 1907).  
7
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genocide,28 principles of humanitarian law,29 the principle of 
self-determination,30 uti possidetis juris,31 the principle of good 
faith,32 the requirement of procedural fairness,33 the principle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23-24 (May 28), 
available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/icj_advisory_ 
opinion_on_reservations_to_the_genocide_convention.pdf (referring to the 
principles underlying the Convention as being “recognized by civilized na-
tions as binding on states, even without any conventional obligation”).  
29 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 218, 220 (June 27), available at 
http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup08/basicmats/icjnicaragua.pdf (describing 
the Geneva Conventions as a “development” or an “expression” of general 
principles of humanitarian law, with those general principles giving rise to 
the obligation on the United States to respect the laws of armed conflict).  
30 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 52 
(June 21), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/53/5595.pdf (refer-
ring to the principle of self-determination as pre-existing the Charter of the 
United Nations, with the Charter merely codifying that principle); East Ti-
mor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 79 (June 30), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/84/6951.pdf (describing the principle as 
“one of the essential principles of contemporary international law”, recog-
nized by the Charter of the United Nations—this recognition implying that it 
pre-existed the development of the Charter); but see, Western Sahara, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 55 (Oct. 16), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf (identifying the principle of self-determination 
in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
the Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), UN Doc A/PV.948 (Dec. 14, 1960).  
31 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 25 
(Dec. 22), available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/ 
case_concerning_the_frontier_dispute_burkina_faso_v._mali_1986_i.c.j._554_
dec_22.pdf  (describing it as a “time-hallowed” principle, though later imply-
ing that its validity vis-a-vis the principle of self-determination derives from 
the consent of states to the respecting of colonial frontiers); Frontier Dispute 
(Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, 2013 I.C.J. 1, ¶¶ 63-64 (Apr. 16) available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/17704.pdf.   
32 Nuclear Tests Case (Austr. v Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, 99  (Dec. 
20), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/59/6161.pdf (describing it 
as “one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of le-
gal obligations”); Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1988 I.C.J. 69, ¶ 94 (Dec. 20), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (quoting the Nuclear Tests 
case with approval); Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Cam. v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 275, ¶ 38 (June 
11), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7453.pdf; Fisheries Ju-
risdiction (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Iceland), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 175, ¶¶ 69-70 
(Jul. 25) (imposing a duty on the parties to negotiate in good faith as part of a 
“self-evident” principle), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/56/ 
6001.pdf; Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the 
WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 74, ¶ 43 (May 21), available 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
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of res judicata,34 the principle of corporate legal personality,35 
the necessary third party rule,36 and the principle of acquies-
cence/estoppel.37 Some of these principles are procedural in na-
ture—res judicata, for example—while others have attained 
the status of a jus cogens norm— for example, the prohibition 
on genocide.38 Some are similar to principles contained in do-
mestic law like good faith and estoppel, while others, such as 
the principle of uti possidetis juris, are more unique to interna-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/65/6303.pdf (identifying the principle of 
good faith as applicable in the relationship between the host state and an in-
ternational institution); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 99 (Jul. 8), available at 
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/NuclearWeapons.pdf (recognizing the 
duty to negotiate in good faith as enshrined in Article VI of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).  
33 Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, ¶ 36 (Apr. 28), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/57/6027.pdf (stating that gen-
eral principles of law require that interested parties have an opportunity to 
submit all relevant arguments to the review tribunal, though this require-
ment may be satisfied through the submission of written statements).  
34 Effect of Award of Compensation Made by the United Nations Admin-
istrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53 (Jul. 13), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/21/2123.pdf (“according to a well-established 
and generally recognized principle of law, a judgment rendered by such a ju-
dicial body is res judicata and has binding force between the parties to the 
dispute.”). See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judg-
ment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 115-116 (Feb. 26), available at, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.  
35 Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. 
Spain), Judgment (Second Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 50 (Feb. 5), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/5387.pdf (referring to the domestic con-
cept of separate corporate legal personality as a rule generally accepted by 
municipal legal systems and thus applicable in this case).  
36 Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943 (Ital. v. Fr.; U.K. & U.S.), 
Preliminary Question, Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32-33 (June 15), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/19/4761.pdf. Reaffirmed in East Timor, su-
pra note 30, at ¶ 34 and Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 
1995 (Maced. v. Greece), Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 43 (Dec. 5), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf.  
37 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 130 (Oct. 12), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/67/6369.pdf (observing that the principles of 
acquiescence and estoppel are both applicable in international law as deriva-
tives of the fundamental principles of good faith and equity).  
38 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Rwan.), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 64 (Feb. 3), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf (referring to the prohibition 
on genocide as “assuredly” having the character of a jus cogens norm).   
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tional law. 
The ICJ has blurred these categories, vaguely referring to 
them as “principles”,39 “fundamental principles”,40 “generally-
recognized” principles,41 “well-recognized” principles,42 “basic 
principles”,43 and “time-hallowed” principles.44 Some may in-
deed fall under Article 38(1)(c) as general principles of law, 
while others are better characterized as rules of customary in-
ternational law under Article 38(1)(b). The Court’s failure to 
specify the source of these principles makes it difficult to iden-
tify a workable method for identifying new rules of interna-
tional law, whatever their source. However, judges in separate 
and dissenting opinions have been somewhat more willing to 
engage with Article 38(1)(c), giving some clarity to this little-
understood provision.  
C. Separate and Dissenting Opinions  
In separate and dissenting opinions, the judges of the ICJ 
and PCIJ have exhibited two distinct approaches to general 
principles: (1) identifying general principles solely in domestic 
legal systems; and (2) identifying general principles from natu-
ral law or the international legal system itself. In support of 
the first approach, Judge Simma’s separate opinion in the Oil 
Platforms case is illustrative.45 He stated: 
 In order to find a solution to our dilemma, I have engaged in 
some research in  comparative law to see whether anything re-
sembling a ‘general principle of law’  within  the meaning of Arti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See, e.g., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 55 (Oct. 
16), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf.   
40 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-
gua,(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 218 (June 27), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf 
41 Effect of Award of Compensation Made by the United Nations Admin-
istrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53 (Jul. 13), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/21/2123.pdf.  
42 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 
9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf.  
43 Nuclear Tests Case (Austr. v Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 46  
(Dec. 20), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/59/6161.pdf. 
44 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, 2013 I.C.J. 1, ¶25 
(Apr. 16) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/17704.pdf. 
45 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 324, ¶66 (Nov. 6) 
(Separate opinion of Judge Simma), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/files/90/9735.pdf. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
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cle 38, paragraph 1 (c), of the Statute of the Court can  be devel-
oped  from solutions arrived at in domestic law to come to terms 
with the  problem of multiple tortfeasors [...]. [O]n the basis of the 
(admittedly modest)  study of comparative  tort law thus provided, 
I venture to conclude that the  principle of joint-and-several  re-
sponsibility common to the jurisdictions I have  considered can 
properly be regarded  as a ‘general principle of law’ within the 
 meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of the Court’s statute.46 
On the second approach, Judge Tanaka’s dissenting opin-
ion in the South West Africa case is illustrative, as he took a 
more natural law approach to general principles.47 He stated, 
in the context of human rights, that  
 The existence of a human right does not depend on the will of 
a State; neither  internally on its law or on any other legislative 
measure, nor internationally on  treaty or custom, in which the 
express or tacit will of a State constitutes the  essential element. 
A State or States are not capable of creating human rights by  law 
or by convention; they can only confirm their existence and give 
them  protection. The role of the State is no more than declarato-
ry. [...] As an  interpretation of Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), we 
consider that the concept of  human rights and of their protection 
is included in the general principles  mentioned in that Article.48  
Other judges manifest a combination of the two approach-
es. Principles identified as general principles in separate and 
dissenting opinions include the principle of restrictive interpre-
tation of provisions stipulating servitudes in treaties,49 the 
right of access to enclaved property,50 the principle of good 
faith,51 the right of self-defence,52 the precautionary principle,53 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 324, ¶¶ 66-74 (Nov. 
6) (Separate opinion of Judge Simma),  
47 South West Africa (Eth. v S. Afr.; Lib. v S. Afr.) Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 
6 (Jul. 18) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/47/4969.pdf. 
48 Id., at 297-298.  
49 Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (Fr. v. Greece), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 71, 137-138 (Oct. 8) (Separate opinion of Judge Séfériades),       
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1937.10.08_ 
lighthouses.htm.  
50 Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Ind. v. Port.), Judgment, 1960 
I.C.J. 6, 66-67 (Apr. 12) (Separate opinion of Judge Wellington Koo) available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/32/4535.pdf.  
51 Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 43 (June 15) 
(Separate opinion of Vice-President Alfaro) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/45/4877.pdf (he explicitly classified the principle under Ar-
11
2014] A CONTEXTUALIZED ACCOUNT  297 
the principle of sustainable development,54 the principle of ex 
injuria jus non oriter,55 and the principle of exceptio non adim-
pleti contractus.56 
As demonstrated, then, there is no well-settled approach to 
Article 38(1)(c) in the world courts. Yet, it remains as a formal 
source of international law beyond treaties and custom, poten-
tially offering an alternative means to develop new rules of in-
ternational law outside of the dominant methods of treaty and 
custom. While the PCIJ and ICJ have offered little elaboration 
on how Article 38(1)(c) should be interpreted, this source of in-
ternational law has spawned a wealth of academic literature 
that has attempted to offer more detailed guidance. Though 
this Article will not discuss at length all of the extant academic 
literature on the use of general principles of law in interna-
tional law, the next section will briefly characterize  the gen-
eral trends in the academic literature, and the theories that 
scholars have developed and employed to determine the scope 
and future of this source.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ticle 38(1)(c)).  
52 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 308-309 (Jul. 8) (Separate opinion of Judge Fleischhauer) 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=498&code=unan&p1 
=3&p2=4&case=95&k=e1&p3=5 (the right exists both in customary interna-
tional law and in all domestic legal systems). 
53Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.), 2010 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 56 (Apr. 20)  (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade) 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. 
54 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.), 
2010 I.C.J. 14,  ¶¶ 141-144 (Apr. 20)  (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade); Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hung./Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25) available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7383.pdf (Separate opinion of Vice-
President Weeramantry). 
55 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 132 
(Jul. 22) (Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade) available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16003.pdf.  
56 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Maced. v. 
Greece), 2011 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 12 (Dec. 5). (Separate opinion of Judge Simma) (re-
ferring to it as a general principle under Article 38(1)(c) because it is widely 
accepted in the common and civil law systems). Judge Ad Hoc Roucounas 
came to the same conclusion regarding the principle under Article 38(1)(c) in 
his dissenting opinion in the same case. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
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D. Academic Approaches   
Interestingly enough, the dominant academic approaches 
to general principles are both positivist approaches that source 
general principles in the positive law of the legal system.  Aca-
demic approaches to Article 38(1)(c) can be classified into two 
main camps: (1) academics who maintain that general princi-
ples can be derived only from domestic legal systems; and (2) 
academics who suggest that general principles can be derived 
from domestic legal systems, as in the domestic approach, but 
also from the structure of the international system itself.57  
  1. The Domestic Approach 
A number of scholars follow the approach originally articu-
lated by Lord Phillimore in the drafting of the Statute of the 
PCIJ.General principles of law are only those that can be iden-
tified in domestic legal systems and transposed to the interna-
tional sphere.58 William Friedmann,59 Jaye Ellis,60 C. Wilfred 
Jenks,61 A.D. McNair,62 Hersch Lauterpacht,63 Fabiàn O. Ro-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 There are two other less-accepted approaches taken. The first, based 
on the Lotus principle (that any act not prohibited by international law is im-
plicitly permitted by international law), rejects general principles altogether 
as superfluous. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 540 (2d 
ed. 1966). The second rejects general principles as an autonomous source of 
law while accepting their utility as a subsidiary means of interpretation, sim-
ilar to judicial decisions or the teachings of publicists. For examples of this 
approach, see e.g., GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE UN DECLARATION ON 
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
66 (1979); Shaw, supra note 14, at 99 (summarizing this conception of general 
principles while not necessarily adhering to this view himself); V.D. DEGAN, 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1997)  (similarly summarizing this ap-
proach); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-85, 191 (1974) (the 
Soviet theorist often cited as the main proponent of this approach) But see 
ELIAS & LIM, supra note 8, at 21-23 (extensively criticizing the conception of 
general principles as a subsidiary source).  
58 Proces-Verbaux of the Proceeding of the Committee (16 June – 24 July 
1920) with Annexes, supra note 18, at 335.  
59 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of General Principles in the Develop-
ment of International Law 57 AM. J. INT’L. L. 279, 284 (1963).  
60 Jaye Ellis, General Principles and Comparative Law 22 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 949 (2011).  
61 CLARENCE. W. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 109-66 (1958).  
62 Arnold Duncan.McNair, The General Principles of Law as Recognized 
by Civilized Nations 33 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L. L. 1 (1957).  
63 Lauterpacht, supra note 12.   
13
2014] A CONTEXTUALIZED ACCOUNT  299 
mano,64 Campbell McLachlan,65 David Bederman,66 and the 
American Law Institute67 are all examples of scholars who ad-
here to this approach.  
These scholars recognize that general principles are an au-
tonomous source of law, but argue that they can be derived on-
ly from municipal legal systems because their ability to bind 
the actions of states depends on the consent of those states. 
That consent can be implied from the common existence of a 
principle in the domestic legal systems of a majority of the 
world’s states. Thus, a comparative assessment of municipal 
legal systems can demonstrate a general principle of law, and it 
then becomes possible to transpose that principle into the in-
ternational legal regime.68 They support this account by point-
ing to the wording of Article 38(1)(c). It is the general principles 
of law “as recognized by civilized nations” that are applicable; 
not general principles of international law full stop.69 While the 
word “civilized” in the provision is obsolete,70 the textual refer-
ence to “nations” is interpreted within these accounts as a ref-
erence to domestic legal systems.71 
  2. The Hybrid Approach: General Principles in the 
Domestic and  International Legal Orders 
This hybrid approach is still a positivist approach, but it 
identifies general principles of law both in domestic legal or-
ders and in the international system itself. A general principle 
of law may be identified and adapted from domestic law into 
the international legal order—the principle of res judicata, for 
example—but it also may be identified from the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 FABIÀN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 45-50 (2008).].  
65 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 259 (2007).  
66 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2002).  
67 Restatement of the Law (Third): The Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States §§34-35 (1987). 
68 Alain Pellet, Article 38 in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 677, 770 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006).  
69 Bederman, supra note 66, at 30.  
70 Boas, supra note 13, at 105.  
71 See e.g,. GENNADY M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 176-77 (1993) (identifying this view out of the debates of the 
drafters of the Statute of the PCIJ).  
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
300 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
system itself. There are varying degrees of opinion on this ap-
proach. Some adhere primarily to the domestic approach while 
accepting that certain principles derived from the unique na-
ture of the international system are still general principles un-
der Article 38(1)(c)—the principle of sovereign equality of 
states, for example.72 Others go further, arguing that general 
principles can develop at the international level, usually em-
bodied in a number of soft law international instruments that 
eventually accumulate binding force for the general principle.73 
There has been little development of methodology under 
this approach. While these scholars approve of the comparative 
inductive approach to deriving principles of law from municipal 
legal systems,74 few other scholars have attempted to develop a 
methodology for deriving general principles of law from the in-
ternational level. Thomas Franck has argued that general 
principles become binding when they pass what he calls the 
“but of course” test: a general principle “should be recognized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 For examples of this approach, see generally Molser, supra note 16, at 
95; Boas, supra note 13, at 107; M Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach 
to General Principles of International Law, 11 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 768, 772 
(1989); HUGH THIRLWAY, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 90, 109 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2010); Degan, supra note 57, at 106; IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (8th  ed. 2008); BIN 
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS 24-25 (1987); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 125-131 (2003). 
73 This is a somewhat unorthodox approach, found mainly in ‘soft law’ 
scholarship. See e.g. ALAN BOYLE, Soft Law in International Law-Making, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 122, 132-34, (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2010); DINAH 
SHELTON, International Law and Relative Normativity, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 141, 167 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2010) (while not explicitly mentioning 
soft law instruments as general principles, her discussion of the use of soft 
law in international law is strikingly similar to most uses of general princi-
ples—for example, general principles preceding treaties and custom or being 
used to fill in gaps in existing international legal instruments); PIERRE-MARIE 
DUPUY, Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 449, 458-
462  (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007); ELIAS &  LIM, supra note 15, at 45-49 
(discussing the problem of ‘soft law’ as being quite similar to the problems 
identified with general principles of law, though providing no guidance on 
how a soft law norm might crystallize into a general principle).  
74 See, e.g., Mosler, supra note 16, at 95; Thirlway, supra note 72, at 109; 
Pauwelyn, supra note 72, at 125-126; Boas, supra note 13, at 107; Bassiouni, 
supra note 72, at 809; Christina Voigt, The Role of General Principles in In-
ternational Law and their Relationship to Treaty Law 31 RETFӔRD ÅRGANG 3, 
7 (2008). 
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as a legitimate norm when the common sense of the interpre-
tive community (governments, judges, scholars) coalesces 
around the principle and regards it as applicable.”75 Others 
have argued that the method for identifying general principles 
is almost identical to the method applied to identify customary 
international law.To identify a general principle in the interna-
tional legal order, one must examine state practice, policies, 
statements, writings of scholars, and international jurispru-
dence as relevant sources.76 This lack of methodological clarity 
makes it difficult to distinguish a general principle from cus-
tomary international law.77 However, these scholars all accept 
that general principles can emerge from international legal re-
lations in themselves, though there is no consensus on how 
such a principle precisely emerges.  
 E. Summary 
As the above discussion shows, no consensus has been 
reached on the status and substance of general principles. Yet, 
this uncertainty may be their greatest strength. They are in-
herently flexible, able to transpose legal ideas from one system 
to another—in Robert Kolb’s words, “general principles are the 
bees of law,”78 providing a means for cross-pollination of rules 
between legal regimes. They can be applied in resolving dis-
putes where treaties and custom are absent, or concurrently 
with those other sources in order to develop and strengthen 
new norms of international law. They thus have the potential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Thomas M. Franck, Non-Treaty Law-Making: When, Where, and How?, 
in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 417, 423 (Rüdger 
Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005).  
76 Bassiouni, supra note 72, at 789. Brownlie also makes brief reference 
to this methodology, though not in much detail. See Brownlie, supra note 72, 
at 19. 
77 Some argue that general principles are lex generalis and customary in-
ternational law is lex specialis: see, e.g., Mosler, supra note 16, at 91; Pau-
welyn, supra note 72, at 131-132; Report of the Int’l. L. Comm’n., Fragmenta-
tion of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., May 1- June 9, July 3 – Aug. 11, 
2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 47 (2006). Others argue that general princi-
ples are an inchoate form of customary international law, reflecting opinio 
juris without the concomitant state practice necessary to form a customary 
rule: see, e.g., Voigt, supra note 74, at 8; Bassiouni, supra note 72, at 791. 
78 Robert Kolb, Principles as Sources of International Law (With Special 
Reference to Good Faith), 53 NETHL. INT’L. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006).  
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to spur the development of international law, providing a 
means for courts and tribunals to construe the formal sources 
of international law in a dynamic fashion in order to adequate-
ly respond to today’s problems.79  
However, potential does not always equate to practice. To 
assess the utility of general principles of international law in 
the dynamic development of new areas of international law, 
this Article compares four specialized areas of international 
law: a) international environmental law, b) international in-
vestment law, c) international criminal law, and d) interna-
tional indigenous law. The methodology for identifying princi-
ples of international environmental and investment law is 
relatively clear. The hybrid approach has been applied to iden-
tify new principles of environmental law, while the domestic 
approach has been applied to identify principles of investment 
law. The methodology applied to general principles of criminal 
law and indigenous law is less clear. While criminal law does 
exhibit some form of the domestic approach, there is uncertain-
ty and overlap among international criminal courts and tribu-
nals as to the proper methodology applied. In indigenous rights 
law, little development has been made on subject-specific prin-
ciples, and where such principles have been identified, the 
methodology used has not been clear.  
III. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  
International environmental law is an area of law that has 
rapidly evolved in response to time-sensitive needs. Some 
would take the view that as the needs of international legal ac-
tors for legal regulation rapidly develop, it is difficult for trea-
ties or custom to maintain the necessary pace of development. 
Because general principles can be identified in a pre-existing 
form in domestic legal orders or in the international legal order 
(depending on the theoretical approach taken), some have tak-
en them to offer significant utility in resolving pressing inter-
national disputes that cannot wait for treaties and custom to 
catch up to the issues of the day. 
Recent writing on the doctrine of international environ-
mental law in public international law has expanded dramati-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Voigt, supra note 74, at 11.  
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cally.80  Many trace the origins of modern international envi-
ronmental law to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm. The resulting Declaration 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
proclaimed twenty-six principles that should guide the behav-
iour of states and other international actors in their behaviour 
toward each other and toward their common environment.81 
These were adopted again in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development.82 International environmental law 
is also governed by a plethora of multilateral treaties83 and 
soft-law instruments.84 However, it is only the use of general 
principles in international environmental law that is of interest 
here. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 As only a small sample of the wealth of recent literature on the topic, 
see Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, The Making of International Law Challenging 
Environmental Protection, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27 (Yann Kerbrat and Sandrine Maljean-Dubois eds., 
2011); PATRICIA BERNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(2009); DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL EDS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007); ULRICH BEYERLIN &  THILO 
MARAUHN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2011); ALEXANDER KISS &  
DINAH SHELTON, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007); VED P. 
NANDA &  GEORGE (ROCK) PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY (2003); PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003).  
81 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in Report of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. 
Doc.A/CONF.48/14, 2 and Corr.1 (1972). 
82 Rio Declaration, supra note 17.  
83 See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dump-
ing of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138 (entered 
into force Aug. 30 1975); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988);  
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989); Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Mar. 22, 
1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (entered into force May 5, 1992); United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
(entered into force Mar. 21, 1994); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 
(entered into force Feb. 16, 2005); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 
1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993); Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entered into force Sept. 11, 
2003). There are many other bilateral and multilateral treaties governing in-
ternational environmental law—this list is merely a brief sample.  
84 See generally Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Qua-
si-Private Standard Setting,  in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).  
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International environmental law, like other areas of inter-
national law, is generally governed by the sources of law set 
out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.85 General princi-
ples of law are applicable in international environmental law 
pursuant to Article 38(1)(c). A number of international envi-
ronmental principles have been identified by states, courts, and 
scholars: the principles of precaution, polluter pays, common 
but differentiated responsibilities, equitable utilization of 
shared natural resources, intergenerational equity, common 
concern of mankind, and sustainable development.86 This Arti-
cle will focus on two: the precautionary principle and the prin-
ciple of sustainable development.  
 A. The Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle is succinctly articulated in the 
1992 Rio Declaration. Principle 15 states: 
 In order to protect the environment, the precautionary ap-
proach shall be widely  applied by States according to their capa-
bilities. Where there are threats of serious  or irreversible dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a  reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
 degradation.87 
This principle requires states to mitigate the risk of envi-
ronmental damage even where there is no full scientific con-
sensus on what those risks are. The principle has been incorpo-
rated in the domestic laws of a number of states and included 
in over fifty multilateral instruments.88 States have argued 
that the precautionary principle is a general principle of law or 
a rule of customary international law before the ICJ in three 
cases, and will likely make similar arguments in future cases.89 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Catherine Redgwell, International Environmental Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 687, 693 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2010).  
86 Ulrich Beyerlin, Different Types of Norms in International Environ-
mental Law: Policies, Principles, and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 426, 426 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 
2007). 
87 Rio Declaration, supra note 17. 
88 Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 597, 599-601 (Daniel Bodansky et al. 
eds., 2007). 
89 The two cases are Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by 
Australia, Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl.. v. Japan), 2010 I.C.J. Pleadings 1 
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The ICJ was first confronted with the precautionary prin-
ciple in its Nuclear Tests cases in the 1970s, where counsel for 
New Zealand had argued that nuclear testing was an activity 
so inherently harmful to the environment that no amount of 
precaution could mitigate its effects.90 While the Court did not 
comment on the precautionary principle in its 1974 decision in 
the case, it did consider the principle when it was asked to re-
evaluate its decision in 1995. New Zealand had argued that the 
precautionary principle was “very widely accepted in contem-
porary international law”91 and thus prohibited France from 
conducting underground nuclear tests. However, the Court 
dismissed the application without pronouncing on the status of 
the precautionary principle.92 
The ICJ was next confronted with the precautionary prin-
ciple in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project case.93 The case con-
cerned a dispute over a treaty concluded between the parties to 
build two series of locks on the Danube. Work began on the pro-
jects, but Hungary decided to suspend its work while it con-
ducted several environmental studies.94 Hungary eventually 
decided to abandon the project based on environmental con-
cerns and terminated the treaty.95 Slovakia disputed Hungary’s 
basis for abandoning its performance of a treaty obligation.96 In 
defence of its actions, Hungary argued that the precautionary 
principle gave rise to an erga omnes obligation to prevent 
transboundary environmental damage and thus justified Hun-
gary’s termination of the treaty.97 While accepting that the 
treaty was worded in a manner that could take into account 
evolving norms of international environmental law, the Court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(May 31, 2010) (alleging various breaches of Japan’s international obligations 
under a number of treaties—environmental and otherwise—due to its whal-
ing program. Oral hearings in the case concluded in July of 2013). 
90 Oral Argument of Professor R.Q. Quentin-Baxter, Nuclear Tests Case 
(Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. Pleadings 108 (vol. II).  
91 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Para-
graph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests 
(N.Z. v. Fr.) Case, Order of Sept. 22, 1995, 1995 I.C.J. 290, ¶ 5.  
92 Id.  ¶ 65.  
93 Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 
Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).   
94 Id. ¶¶ 28-33.  
95 Id.  ¶ 38.  
96 Id. ¶ 43.  
97 Id. ¶ 97.  
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still held that Hungary had not validly terminated the treaty.98  
The ICJ was again confronted with the precautionary prin-
ciple in its 2010 judgment in the Case Concerning Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay.99 The case concerned the interpretation 
of a bilateral treaty between Argentina and Uruguay establish-
ing a regime for the use of the River Uruguay, which formed 
part of the boundary between the two states.100 Argentina insti-
tuted proceedings in the ICJ, alleging numerous breaches by 
Uruguay of its procedural and substantive obligations under 
the bilateral treaty.101 Argentina had argued that the precau-
tionary principle operated to reverse the burden of proof in this 
situation, requiring Uruguay to prove that it had taken appro-
priate steps to prevent risks of environmental damage.102 
Without commenting on the validity and applicability of the 
precautionary principle itself, the Court did not accept Argen-
tina’s argument regarding the reversal of the burden of 
proof.103 However, the Court did require Uruguay to utilize en-
vironmental impact assessments, which are precautionary in 
nature.104 
In a strongly-worded separate opinion, Judge Cançado 
Trindade lamented the inattention paid by the majority to gen-
eral principles of international environmental law. He traced 
the principles of environmental law from the time of Plato 
through to the Rio Declaration, arguing that they are well-
established principles of international law itself.105 He argued 
that, even though the Court had consistently refused to com-
ment on the legal status of the precautionary principle, this did 
not mean that the principle does not exist.106 He noted that 
both parties had referred to the existence of the precautionary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Id. ¶¶ 111-114.  
99 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 
I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20, 2010). 
100 Id.,  ¶¶ 26-27.  
101 Id.  ¶ 47.  
102 Id.   ¶ 160.  
103 Id.   ¶ 164.  
104 See Daniel Kazhdan, Precautionary Pulp: Pulp Mills and the Evolving 
Dispute between International Tribunals over the Reach of the Precautionary 
Principle 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 527, 547 (2011).  
105 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 56-61 (Apr. 20, 2010). (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trin-
dade). 
106 Id. at ¶ 68.  
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principle in their pleadings and both had conceded its applica-
tion in this case: 
 [I]t appears significant to me that Uruguay, even though argu-
ing that constitutive  elements of the principle at issue were not 
in its view consubstantiated in the  present case, never ques-
tioned or denied the existence or material content of the  principle 
concerned. In sum, the existence itself of the principles of preven-
tion  and of precaution, general principles of law proper to Inter-
national Environmental  Law, was admitted and acknowledged by 
the contending parties themselves,  Uruguay and Argentina.107 
He thus identified the precautionary principle as a general 
principle of international law, not customary international law. 
He derived it mainly from natural law,108 but also in interna-
tional legal instruments.109 In his view, the precautionary prin-
ciple as a general principle of international law under Article 
38(1)(c) should have been applied by the majority decision in 
the case in interpreting the obligations of Uruguay under the 
treaty between the parties. 
Other international tribunals have engaged with the pre-
cautionary principle in their decisions. A dissenting opinion in 
the 2003 Mox Plant Case referred to the precautionary princi-
ple as an established principle of customary international 
law.110 The case concerned a dispute between the UK and Ire-
land under the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Ma-
rine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR Con-
vention). Ireland had argued that the UK was required, 
pursuant to Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention,111 to fully dis-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Id. at ¶ 112 (emphasis in original).  
108 See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 71-72, 75-89. 
109 Id., at ¶ 73 (identifying it in the Rio Declaration) and ¶¶ 93-95 (identi-
fying it in the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the 
Montreal Protocol, the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Af-
rica and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Haz-
ardous Wastes within Africa, the OSPAR Convention, the Convention on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the UNFCCC, and the Kyoto Protocol).  
110 Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the 
OSPAR Convention (Ire. v. U.K.) 28 R.I.A.A. 59, ¶ 73 (OSPAR Convention 
2003) (Dissenting Opinion of Garan Griffith Q.C.) [hereinafter Mox Plant 
Case].  
111 See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 (entered into force 
Mar. 25, 1998). Article 9 states:  
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close the contents of two reports commissioned by the UK gov-
ernment regarding the feasibility and effects of constructing a 
mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) plant in Cumbria, on the coast of the 
Irish Sea.112 The Permanent Court of Arbitration, while finding 
that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, interpreted the terms 
of the OSPAR Convention to hold that the UK did not have an 
obligation to disclose the two reports, and thus rejected Ire-
land’s claims.113  
One of the arbitrators, Garan Griffith, dissented on a 
number of grounds. Notably, he applied the precautionary 
principle—both as an independent principle of customary in-
ternational law and as a treaty provision114—to shift the bur-
den of proof to the UK in order to prove that the proposed Mox 
Plant would not produce future damage to the marine envi-
ronment.115 In sourcing the precautionary principle, he referred 
to it as an “established principle of customary international 
law”,116 while relying on a European Commission report as 
proof, which referred to the precautionary principle as a “full-
fledged and general principle of international law.”117 He refer-
enced the numerous sources that the Commission had relied 
on, which included international instruments, EU legislation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that their competent authorities 
are required to make  available the information described in paragraph 2 of 
this Article to any natural or legal person, in  response to any reasonable re-
quest, without that person's having to prove an interest, without  unreasona-
ble charges, as soon as possible and at the latest within two months. 
2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is any avail-
able information in written, 
visual, aural or data-base form on the state of the maritime area, on ac-
tivities or measures  adversely affecting or likely to affect it and on activities 
or measures introduced in accordance  with the Convention. 
112 Mox Plant Case ¶¶ 41-42.   
113 Mox Plant Case  ¶ 185.  
114 Article 2(2)(a) of the OSPAR Convention states: “The Contracting Par-
ties shall apply: (a) the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive 
measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that 
substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine envi-
ronment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources 
and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate 
uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal rela-
tionship between the inputs and the effects.” 
115 Mox Plant Case ¶ 73.  
116 Id.  
117 Id, n. 46, citing Communication From the Commission on the Precau-
tionary Principle, at 11, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000). 
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and numerous treaties and reports as evidence for the precau-
tionary principle’s status as customary international law.118 
Yet the Commission itself had used those sources to conclude 
that the precautionary principle is a general principle of inter-
national law. The existence of the precautionary principle in 
international law seems to be unquestioned, but, as the Mox 
Plant case demonstrates, there is some confusion as to its 
source.  
The precautionary principle was argued before the WTO 
Appellate Body as either a general principle or a principle of 
customary international law in the EC – Hormones case, 
though the Appeal Body chose not to comment on the status of 
the principle.119 It was also invoked by the parties as a general 
principle of international law in the Southern Bluefish Tuna 
Cases,120 and arguably implicitly endorsed as a general princi-
ple in that case.121 A WTO Panel was confronted with a dispute 
over the legal status of the precautionary principle in 2006 and, 
while noting the endorsement of the principle in a number of 
binding and non-binding international and domestic instru-
ments, refused to comment on its status in international law.122 
The precautionary principle was rejected as a “general princi-
ple of international law” in the 2013 Indus Waters arbitration, 
though the tribunal subsequently clarified that it was referring 
to the principle’s status as customary international law.123 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Mox Plant Case (Dissenting opinion of Garan Griffith Q.C.), 28 
R.I.A.A. 59, ¶ 73, n. 46.  
119 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concern-
ing Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (1998), ¶ 123, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998)  [hereinafter EC – Hormones Case].  
120 Southern Bluefish Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 23 
R.I.A.A. 1, 14 ¶ 31 (Arbitral Tribunal 2000). 
121 See Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion 
of Feb. 1, 2011, ¶ 132, available at 
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=109#c587 (stating that the tribunal had 
implicitly endorse the precautionary principle in the Southern Bluefish Tuna 
Cases).  
122 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Ap-
proval and Mtarketing of Biotech Products, (2006),  ¶¶ 7.88-
7.89,WT/DS291/R, WT/DS293/R, (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC – Biotech 
Products].  
123 Indus Waters Arbitration (India v. Pak.), Final Award, ¶ 112 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb., 2013), available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392.  
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The status of the precautionary principle has thus not been 
authoritatively decided in the international jurisprudence. The 
precautionary principle had some origins in domestic law,124 
but its main formulation has been on the international plane in 
a number of treaties and declarations.125  The domestic ap-
proach would thus deny its validity. Nevertheless it has been 
widely accepted in a number of authoritative international en-
vironmental law treaties and from there has increasingly found 
acceptance in the domestic law of states. It has been put for-
ward by a number of states before international courts and tri-
bunals, indicating that those states perceive it to be a binding 
principle. It is debatable whether sufficient state practice and 
opinio juris exist to solidify the precautionary principle as a 
principle of customary international law, given its recent legal 
status. Although, using the hybrid approach, its widespread 
recognition by states in international instruments and in their 
pleadings before international courts and tribunals as a bind-
ing principle can classify it as a general principle under Article 
38(1)(c). In international environmental law, then, the hybrid 
approach provides a better explanation for the existence of the 
precautionary principle as a binding principle.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See Svitlana Kravchenko et. al., Principles of International Environ-
mental Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 43, 46 (Shawkat Alam et al eds., 2013) (discussing its early formulation 
in West German environmental law and implicitly in several American envi-
ronmental statutes).  
125 See, e.g., Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/10 (1990); Bamako Convention on the Ban of the 
Import to Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Manage-
ment of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, 2101 U.N.T.S. 242, 
Art. 4(f) (entered into force Apr. 22, 1998); Protocol on Water and Health to 
the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water-
courses and International Lakes (June 17, 1999), 2331 U.N.T.S. 202 Art. 5(a) 
(entered into force Aug. 4, 2005); Convention for the Protection on the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (Sept. 22, 1992), 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 
Art. 2(2)(a) (entered into force Mar. 25, 1998); UNFCCC, supra note 83, Art 
3(3); Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (May 22, 2001), 
2256 U.N.T.S. 119, Arts. 1, 8(9) (entered into force May 17, 2004); Rio Decla-
ration, supra note 17, Principle 15; United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, Aug. 26 – Sept. 4, 2002, Agenda 21: A Programme for 
Action for Sustainable Development, Annex II, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 
II-IV), 311 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
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 B. The Principle of Sustainable Development 
The principle of sustainable development has not had the 
same level of discussion, argument, codification, and clarifica-
tion as the precautionary principle has, though it is quickly ap-
proaching the same level of international consensus that the 
precautionary principle enjoys. The principle of sustainable de-
velopment was formally introduced in the 1987 Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our 
Common Future, commonly known as the Brundtland Re-
port.126 This report defined sustainable development as “devel-
opment that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.”127 Sustainable development has subsequently been in-
cluded in a number of binding and non-binding international 
instruments and domestic law, and has been increasingly in-
voked in front of international courts and tribunals. 
The ICJ first endorsed the concept of sustainable develop-
ment in its decision in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project case. 
The Court stated: 
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other rea-
sons, constantly  interfered with nature. In the past, this was of-
ten done without consideration of  the effects upon the environ-
ment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing 
awareness of the risks for mankind—for present and future gen-
erations—of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and 
unabated  pace, new norms and standards have been developed, 
set forth in a great number of instruments during the last two 
decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, 
and such new standards given proper weight, not only when 
States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with 
activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic de-
velopment with protection of the environment is aptly expressed 
in the concept of sustainable development.128 
In his separate opinion, Vice-President Weeramantry elab-
orated on this paragraph, discussing sustainable development 
as more than a mere concept—he viewed it as a “principle with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR 
COMMON FUTURE (1987).  
127 Id, at 43.  
128 Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 
Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 140 (Sept. 25). 
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normative value” crucial to the disposition of the case.129 He 
noted that both parties to the case had endorsed it as a princi-
ple of international law, its main function being to reconcile the 
principles of economic development with the principle of envi-
ronmental protection.130 He found the principle’s normative au-
thority in its endorsement in multilateral treaties, internation-
al declarations, documents of international organizations, 
regional declarations, state practice,131 as well as in the prac-
tices of cultures and civilizations for millennia.132 
The principle of sustainable development has been ad-
dressed to a varying extent in other international cases. In his 
separate opinion in the Pulp Mills case, Judge Cançado Trin-
dade cited the principle of sustainable development as a gen-
eral principle of law.133 It was addressed by the Appellate Body 
of the WTO in the US—Shrimp case as an interpretive princi-
ple.134 In the Iron Rhine Arbitration, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration referred to the principle of sustainable develop-
ment as an “emerging” principle of environmental law.135 
The principle of sustainable development has also been 
embodied in a number of multilateral treaties,136 non-binding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovak.), 
Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25) (Separate opinion of Vice-President 
Weeramantry). 
130 Id. at 89-90.  
131 Id. at 93.  
132 Id. at 107-110.  
133 Pulp Mills (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade), supra note 
14, at ¶¶ 139-147.  
134 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibitions of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R ¶¶ 129-131 (Oct. 12, 
1998) [US—Shrimp Case] (the Appellate Body considered it to be relevant in 
interpreting the obligations of the parties in conserving natural resources, 
since the principle was included in the preamble to the WTO Agreement).  
135 Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) 
Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, 27 R.I.A.A. 35, ¶¶ 58-59 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, May 24, 
2005) [Iron Rhine Arbitration]. Notably the tribunal applied the duty to rec-
oncile environmental protection with economic development—giving rise to 
the duty to mitigate environmental damage—as a general principle of law. 
This closely resembles the principle of sustainable development; see also 
CHRISTINA VOIGT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLIMATE MEASURES AND 
WTO LAW 176 (2009) [Voight, Sustainable Development].  
136 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 83, Arts 2, 8; 
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 83, Preamble; Convention on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants, supra note 124, Art 7.3; UNFCCC, supra note 83, Art 3(4); 
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instruments,137 and in domestic law.138 Similar to the precau-
tionary principle, its origins are primarily international; it was 
not identified nor transposed from domestic legal orders. Being 
that it has no domestic origin, the domestic approach to general 
principles would deny its binding force. It is likely not a rule of 
customary international law because there is no widespread ev-
idence of state practice—and frequent violations of the princi-
ple, especially in developing countries. But it has widespread 
state recognition, even if state practice does not always con-
form to that recognition. It has been applied in cases resolving 
international disputes, indicating that it has some binding 
force.139 The hybrid approach to general principles, accepting 
this widespread state recognition of the principle of sustainable 
development as a general principle of international law proper, 
could view it as a general principle of law, applicable as an au-
tonomous source of law under Article 38(1)(c).  
 C. Summary 
Thus, norms of environmental law are quickly emerging 
with widespread state recognition, even if they are not reflected 
in state practice. The legal force of these norms depends on 
whether they can be classified under Article 38(1)(c)—
otherwise, under a traditional approach, they do not constitute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1992), Preamble; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, Preamble (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1995).  
137 See, e.g., United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, UN 
Doc A/Res/55/2 (2000), goal 7; the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Jul. 
11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 1 Art 3(j) (entered into force May 26, 2001); and the 
International Law Association’s New Delhi Declaration of Principles of Inter-
national Law Relating to Sustainable Development, I.L.A. Res. 3/2002, UN 
Doc A/57/329. It has been included in a number of World Bank reports: for a 
large list, see Sustainable Development Topics and Themes, WORLD BANK 
(Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
TOPICS/EXTSDNET/0,,contentMDK:22180649~menuPK:64885123~pagePK:
64885161~piPK:64884432~theSitePK:5929282,00.html. It has also been in-
corporated in a number of OECD publications: for example, see THE DAC 
GUIDELINES: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2001).  
138 See Voigt, Sustainable Development, supra note 135, at 23-24 for a 
list of countries which have incorporated the principle of sustainable devel-
opment in their domestic legislation: these include Germany, Norway, Aus-
tralia, Argentina, and New Zealand. 
139 See the discussion of the Iron Rhine Arbitration, above, supra note 
135. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
314 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
a source of law. While the domestic approach to general princi-
ples would deny their legal force, the fact that they are fre-
quently raised as legal principles in international jurispru-
dence and sometimes applied to resolve disputes indicates that 
both states and tribunals perceive these principles as having 
legal force. They are not merely soft law norms, which though 
persuasive, are not binding. Rather, they do have binding force, 
obligating states to take measures to mitigate risk and to en-
sure that their economic development will not compromise the 
environment for future generations.140  
International environmental law has a distinct approach to 
general principles of law. Even though numerous multilateral 
treaties govern the area, general principles of law have been 
developed through soft law instruments on the international 
level such as the Rio Declaration, and subsequently applied in 
interstate disputes beyond the provisions of the applicable 
treaties. They closely resemble principles of customary interna-
tional law, with the only difference being that general princi-
ples retain their normative force even in the absence of state 
adherence, a possibility which the classic formulation of cus-
tomary international law denies. The fact that they have au-
tonomous normative force at all indicates that the domestic ap-
proach to general principles is not satisfactory in the realm of 
international environmental law; it cannot explain the exist-
ence of these principles. The hybrid approach, which can identi-
fy these principles on the international level and classifies 
them under Article 38(1)(c) as an autonomous, formal source of 
law, provides a better explanation for their emergence and 
their use in guiding the behaviour of states and other interna-
tional actors. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
In contrast to the use of general principles in international 
environmental law, international investment law has strictly 
adhered to the domestic approach when identifying general 
principles. International investment law is a specialized regime 
governed by thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See Alan Boyle, supra note 73, at 134 (discussing how general princi-
ples of environmental law derive their authority from the endorsement of 
states, and influence both the outcome of litigation and the practice of states. 
As such, they closely resemble opinio juris).   
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that provide for the rights of foreign investors vis-a-vis the host 
state, and allow those investors to pursue legal action under in-
ternational law against that host state without needing to uti-
lize the formal channels of diplomatic protection.141  These 
treaties often include a choice of law provision stating that the 
relevant rules of international law are applicable in settling 
disputes under the treaty.142 This area of law developed quite 
rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s as a form of public international 
law through the practice of international arbitration. Because 
there was little authoritative treaty and custom in the area, 
arbitrators frequently relied on general principles in resolving 
disputes during the formative years of international invest-
ment law.143 While general principles have been used in a 
number of different contexts, they have been most frequently 
used in determining the applicability and scope of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard under international law.  
 A. The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
Fair and equitable treatment is a commonly used standard 
in international investment agreements, requiring states to 
treat domestic investors both fairly and equitably. While it is 
incorporated into most investment agreements between states 
and investors, the substantive content of this standard is de-
fined by public international law, specifically by BITs, general 
principles, and customary international law.144 Fair and equi-
table treatment has given rise to much litigation in the inter-
national investment law context because of the way treaty pro-
visions are often framed. For example, Article 1105(1) of 
NAFTA states: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See, e.g., SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: 
RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 30-32 (2d ed., 2012) (discussing the de-
velopment of the ICSID regime as a “silent revolution” in international law).  
142 ROLAND KLÄGER, ‘FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 105 (2011).  
143 Stephan W. Schill, General Principles of Law and Investment Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
133, 134 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric de Brabandere eds., 2012) [Schill, General 
Principles].   
144 See Kläger, supra note 142, at 15-20 (discussing the use of various in-
ternational law sources in determining the nature of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard).  
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 Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another 
Party treatment in  accordance with international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full  protection and security.145 
In another example, the Canadian model BIT states at Ar-
ticle 5: 
 1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in 
accordance with  the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens,  including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security. 
 2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full pro-
tection and  security” in paragraph 1 do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that  which is required by the customary in-
ternational law minimum standard of  treatment of aliens.146 
As these two examples show, states are obligated to accord 
fair and equitable treatment to investors, without any guidance 
on what fair and equitable treatment actually means.   
BITs are, in a simple sense, inter-state treaties. Thus, Ar-
ticle 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is 
applicable in their interpretation. This Article states: “3. There 
shall be taken into account, together with the context: [...] (c) 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between the  parties.”147 
General principles, as rules of international law, are thus 
automatically applicable to the interpretation of obligations 
under a BIT or an international investment treaty such as 
NAFTA unless the treaty specifically states otherwise.  
In determining the scope of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard, international tribunals have had recourse both 
to general principles of law and to principles of customary in-
ternational law.148 However, these tribunals are not particular-
ly careful about articulating the source of international legal 
rules, which they apply in interpreting the scope of the fair and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 136, art. 1105(1).  
146 Canada 2004 Model BIT, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, available 
at italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf . 
147 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 11, Art 31(3)(c).  
148 Roland Kläger terms this link between the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard under investment law and the use of general principles and 
customary international law as the “gateway” between investment law and 
general international law, overcoming fragmentation in the international 
system. See KLÄGER, supra note 142, at 94-95.  
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equitable treatment standard.149 In the Mondev International 
case, the tribunal stated that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard embodied in Article 1105 of NAFTA is analogous to 
fair and equitable treatment in customary international law, 
with that custom proved by the uniform inclusion of fair and 
equitable treatment clauses in thousands of bilateral and re-
gional investment treaties.150 In the Saluka Investments case, 
the tribunal linked the concept of fair and equitable treatment 
to the domestic concept of legitimate expectations, stating: 
 The standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is therefore 
closely tied to the  notion of legitimate expectations, which is the 
dominant element of that standard.  [...] The expectation of for-
eign investors certainly includes the observation by the  host 
State of such well-established fundamental standards as good 
faith, due  process, and non-discrimination.151 
Tribunals have sourced the fair and equitable treatment 
standard under the principle of good faith in Article 38(1)(c) of 
the Statute of the ICJ, utilizing a comparative approach to de-
termining the scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectations in 
domestic systems in order to determine the content of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard on the international level.152 
Others have interpreted the principles of good faith and the 
prohibition of arbitrariness as general principles of law appli-
cable under Article 1105(1) of NAFTA.153 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See, e.g., Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tri-
bunals – An Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 301, 312 (2008) (survey-
ing 98 decisions of ICSID Tribunals. Despite using international law in inter-
pretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, no tribunal of the 98 
assessed carried out an assessment of whether a rule of customary interna-
tional law existed, and only eight of those tribunals referred to general prin-
ciples as a separate source of international law).  
150 Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 117 (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003).  
151 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, 
Partial Award, ¶¶ 302-303 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2006), available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=105.  
152 Total S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision 
on Liability, ¶¶ 111, 128-132 (Dec. 27, 2010), available at 
italaw.com/documents/TotalvArgentina_DecisionOnLiabilty.pdf. 
153 See Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v Canada, Award, (Mar. 31, 2010) ¶ 
187 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes), available 
at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf . The tribu-
nal stated: 
The Tribunal must note that general principles of law also have a role 
to play in this discussion.  Even if the Tribunal were to accept Canada’s 
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What is notable in the interpretation of fair and equitable 
treatment by various tribunals is the use of domestic principles 
of law. The tribunals have generally utilized principles of ad-
ministrative law—for example, legitimate expectations or due 
process—in determining the scope of treatment that host states 
are required to accord to foreign investors. International inves-
tors expect treatment in foreign countries to correspond to the 
treatment they enjoy in their home state. They expect fair and 
equitable treatment, which is guaranteed in their home state 
by domestic principles like legitimate expectations or due pro-
cess. In determining the scope of fair and equitable treatment 
in foreign states, investors and tribunals apply, by analogy, the 
principles that guarantee fair and equitable treatment in do-
mestic law. They thus transpose these principles from the do-
mestic level to the international level in order to develop a 
standard of treatment of private actors in foreign countries, 
which closely corresponds to the standard of treatment enjoyed 
in their home states.154 This is an example of the domestic ap-
proach to general principles.  
 B. Other General Principles 
Other principles that are present in international invest-
ment law (and sometimes also in other areas, such as interna-
tional trade law) have been developed in applicable treaties 
and in the jurisprudence. These include: the principle of full 
protection and security, most-favoured-nation treatment, the 
national treatment principle, protection against expropriation, 
and principles related to the requisite level of compensation for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
argument to the effect that good faith, the prohibition  of arbitrariness, 
discrimination and other questions raised in this case are not 
standalone  obligations under Article 1105(1) or international law, and 
might not be part of customary law  either, these concepts are to a large 
extent the expression of general principles of law and hence  also a part 
of international law. Each question will have to be addressed on its own 
merits, as some  might closely be related to such principles while other 
issues are not. Good faith and the  prohibition of arbitrariness are no 
doubt an expression of such general principles and no tribunal  today 
could be asked to ignore these basic obligations of international law. 
The availability of a  secure legal environment has a close connection to 
such principles and transparency, while more  recent, appears to be fast 
approaching that standard. 
154 McLachlan et al, supra note 65, at 259.  
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expropriation.155 The principle of full protection and security is 
found in many BITs and NAFTA, requiring the host state to 
take all measures of precaution necessary to protect the in-
vestment of foreigners within its territory,156 which is generally 
satisfied by the state exercising due diligence.157  The most-
favoured-nation principle is based on the principle of reciproci-
ty, requiring a host country to treat investors from one foreign 
country equally to investors from any other foreign country.158 
The national treatment principle prohibits a state from dis-
criminating based on the nationality of the ownership of an in-
vestment, essentially requiring that foreign-owned investments 
receive the same advantages as national-owned investments.159 
The prohibition against expropriation prohibits a state from 
taking the property of an investor or substantially depriving 
the investor of the benefits of that property.160 Finally, most 
BITs and free trade agreements require states to pay full com-
pensation to investors for any expropriation.161 While many of 
these principles are embodied in treaties and thus enforceable 
as treaty provisions, they have also been interpreted as free-
standing principles applicable in international investment dis-
putes even where the treaty is silent on their applicability. As 
such, they are treated as general principles of international 
law, but their origins are in state-based agreement to their 
presence in treaties and thus, represent simply a variant on 
the domestic approach to general principles predominant in 
this area of law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155  The standard for compensation is of course controversial, with a 
“prompt, adequate, and effective” standard of full compensation flowing from 
the American Hull formula but with many Latin American states advocating 
the Calvo doctrine.  This Article does not seek to resolve these disputes but 
simply acknowledges that although the US approach has largely made its 
way into international investment law through treaties, some measure of de-
bate is ongoing. 
156 Saluka Investments, supra note 151, at ¶¶ 483-484.  
157 Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, at ¶ 
164  (Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/ita0565.pdf. 
158 Subedi, supra note 141, at 68.  
159 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award of 
the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, at Part IV, ch B, ¶ 11 (UNCITRAL, 
Aug. 3, 2005).  
160 Subedi, supra note 141, at 74-75 (describing both direct and indirect 
expropriation).  
161 Id., at 79.  
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
320 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
V. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 A. Introduction 
During at least a certain period of its development, partic-
ularly during the leading era of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
tribunals,162 international criminal law drew on general princi-
ples relatively frequently.163  One prominent scholar of general 
principles in international criminal law, Fabián O. Raimondo, 
has actually hinted that international criminal law’s use of 
these principles encouraged their use in other areas in causal 
terms.164  Indeed, he goes so far as to say that “[p]rovocatively 
speaking, general principles of law were a dormant source of 
international law which was revived in international criminal 
law because there were legal gaps to fill and imprecise legal 
rules to interpret.”165  However, that story is too simple for two 
reasons.  First, some of the revived uses in other areas actually 
preceded the Tribunals’ use of general principles.166  While this 
Article would not dismiss entirely the idea of an interaction be-
tween areas of international law where they have encouraged 
one another’s use of general principles, there is frankly no sim-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162  See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE (2006) (dis-
cussing in general terms the significance of the tribunals and their place 
within the history of international criminal law).  See also, Statute of the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and 
S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. 
s/RES/827 (1993) (being the instrument establishing the ICTY) and Statute 
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 
1598, 1600 (1994) (being the instrument establishing the ICTR). 
163  See generally RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES supra note 64, at 73; 
Fabián O. Raimando, General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity, and the 
Development of International Criminal Law, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 
2010). Cf. also RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, id., at 94 (noting that where 
there are clear rules for a particular tribunal in treaty or in its constituting 
statute, those rules will be lex specialis and thus preclude resort to general 
principles in such circumstances), 158-63 (noting several uses of general 
principles by the Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
164  RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 193. 
165  Id. 
166  See e.g. Part III, above (discussing articulation of general principles 
in international environmental law context prior to 1990s). 
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ple story that, say, international criminal law revived them 
that is consistent with the evidence.   
Indeed, this claim is strengthened by the fact that the con-
cept of “principles” is that much more complex in international 
criminal law than in other areas of law.  Generally speaking, in 
the criminal law area especially, the term “principles” can refer 
to norms that have not hardened into rules, as well as to the 
more technical concept of “general principles of law”.167  In 
criminal law contexts, specifically, there has often been 
thought to be a general part, consisting of principles, quite 
apart from the technical sense of general principles as a source 
of law.  This general part of criminal law may actually embrace 
certain of the matters that the Tribunals at least purported to 
analyze in terms of the more specific general principles analy-
sis.  General principles, in the non-technical sense of a common 
part to the criminal law, are often thought to cover such mat-
ters as the presumption of innocence, the rights of the accused, 
individual criminal responsibility, the responsibility of com-
manders and superiors, principles of mens rea, and defenses.168   
Interestingly enough, some statements from the Tribunals 
reflect a blurring of these two different ideas of general princi-
ples.  Consider, for example, the following passage: 
General principles of international criminal law, whenever they 
may be distilled by dint of construction, generalisation or logical 
inference, may also be relied upon.  In addition, it is now clear 
that to fill possible gaps in international customary and treaty 
law, international and national criminal courts may draw upon 
general principles of criminal law as they derive from the conver-
gence of the principal penal systems of the world.  Where neces-
sary, the Trial Chamber shall use such principles to fill any lacu-
nae in the Statute of the International Tribunal and in 
customary law.  However, it will always be necessary to bear in 
mind the dangers of wholesale incorporation of principles of na-
tional law into the unique system of international criminal law as 
applied by the International Tribunal.169  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167  KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL Law 7 (2009). 
168  WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 203-232 (2007). 
169  Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 677 (Int’l. 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). 
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The first sentence would actually appear to be referring to 
“general principles” in (what is for international law purposes) 
the non-technical sense of the common part to the criminal law, 
given its references to the use of simple construction or logical 
inference, while the remainder represents an embrace of gen-
eral principles in the more technical sense of those with inter-
national law status, although the term “general principles” ac-
tually appears only in the first sentence.  Within the 
terminology of the other parts of this Article,170 there may be 
yet more complex hybridizations going on within international 
criminal law than within international environmental law.  
However, further examining these hybridizations and the rea-
sons for them involves further unpacking the use of general 
principles in this area.      
In his study on the use of general principles in the interna-
tional criminal tribunals, Raimando has suggested that the 
tendency to use general principles on a widespread basis in the 
Tribunals was possible because of the relatively new standing 
of the field, the limited detail articulated for the operations of 
these tribunals, the need for compelling legal reasoning when 
justifying decisions, and the obvious analogies available be-
tween domestic and international criminal law problems.171  It 
is important to set out some of the evidence of this use of gen-
eral principles in the tribunals, and this Part will begin by do-
ing so, while also referencing some of the methodological uncer-
tainties or even dangers that have been evident with such uses.   
With that said, it would be inaccurate to limit the analysis 
to this claim.  The types of methodological uncertainties or 
dangers that grow gradually in this Part’s analysis of the Tri-
bunals’ use of general principles have arguably motivated some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170  See supra Part II. 
171  See RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 73-74.  But see 
also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Opinion of Judges 
McDonald and Vohrah, ¶ 56 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
7, 1997) (“Paragraph 58 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations presented on 3 May 1993 expressly directs the International Tribu-
nal to this source of law: ‘The International Tribunal itself will have to decide 
on various personal defences which may relieve a person of individual crimi-
nal responsibility, such as minimum age or mental incapacity, drawing upon 
general principles of law recognised by all nations”, with this passage thus 
raising the possibility that the judges thought of themselves as applying gen-
eral principles not in light of any such deep-seated theoretical approaches but 
just out of following orders). 
37
2014] A CONTEXTUALIZED ACCOUNT  323 
caution by various international actors.  Thus, this Part also 
goes on to show some of the ways in which the international le-
gal order in this area, becoming aware of the potential of gen-
eral principles and their risks, has also sought in the context of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) to impose limits on 
them specific to the needs of the particular domain of interna-
tional law at issue.172   One result is that the ICC is thus argu-
ably unlikely to be making similarly extensive use of general 
principles as the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals had.173  
General principles, this Article argues, may have had a histori-
cally temporary role in international criminal law, although it 
is also not possible to exclude a possible new resurgence in 
their use. 
 B. General Principles in the International Criminal 
Tribunals 
The very earliest encounter of the international criminal 
law system with general principles actually might have led ob-
servers initially to suspect that general principles would not 
have much impact in this domain.  Immediately following 
World War II, in the Nuremberg proceedings,174 the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal (IMT) was confronted with a well 
known and widely discussed175 defense argument that any pun-
ishment for aggressive war would amount to ex post facto retri-
bution.176  On the defense argument, such ex post facto retribu-
tion was contrary to general principles of international law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  See infra  Section C. 
173  Id. 
174  See generally, ROBERT WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960) (a classic account of the Nuremberg trials); Bert 
Röling, The Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in A TREATISE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 591 (Cherif Bassiouni & Ved Nanda eds., 1973) 
(similarly offering a leading classic account of Nuremberg trials). 
175  See, e.g., RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 78; 
Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04, ¶¶ 13-14 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. (2010) 
(dissenting opinion of Judge Costa joined by Judges Kalaydjieva and Poale-
lungi) (three judges in European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber de-
cision implying that Nuremberg did violate ex post facto principles and might 
not be sustainable under current European human rights jurisprudence, thus 
exemplifying lingering discussion of this aspect of the case in many different 
contexts).  
176  Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of 
German Major War Criminals 38 (1946). 
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since a prohibition on ex post facto punishment was present 
throughout different domestic criminal law orders.177  However, 
the IMT held that the principle nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
lege “is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a prin-
ciple of justice”,178 thus, rejecting any legal status to something 
arguably meeting the standards of a general principle of law. 
With that said, when one looks beyond this well-known ex-
ample, it is remarkable that at the same time, and indeed in 
the very same case, the same tribunal was in fact ready to 
draw upon general principles in some respects.  For example, 
in articulating a legal test under Article 8 of its Charter,179 con-
cerning superior orders, the IMT suggested that the wide-
spread test in domestic criminal law systems involved not the 
mere existence of orders but whether moral choice remained 
possible.180  In drawing upon this reasoning, whether or not it 
interpreted generally existing law correctly,181 the IMT drew 
upon a general principle of law in offering its conclusion and its 
approach to the test for criminal responsibility in the face of 
superior orders.182  It would also appear to have done so with 
respect to a general principle of personal culpability in criminal 
law.183  So, although the IMT is well known for having rejected 
a major defense argument grounded in general principles of in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177  Id. 
178  Id. at 39. 
179  Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), in Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis (London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 
82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
180  See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of 
German Major War Criminals, supra note 176, at 42 (stating that “[t]he pro-
visions of this Article are in conformity with the law of nations.  That a sol-
dier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war 
has never been recognized as a defence to such acts of brutality, though, as 
the Charter provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punish-
ment.  The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of 
most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was 
in fact possible.”) 
181  Cf., RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 79 (“Contrary 
to the IMT’s view, whether Article 8 conformed with the ten existing general 
international law is doubtful.  Actually, until the Second World War superior 
orders always excluded the criminal responsibility of the subordinate who 
acted under those orders; only the superior was criminally responsible.”) 
182  See id. at 79 (stating that “the IMT resorted to a general principle of 
law in order to reach that conclusion”).  
183  See id. at 80-81. 
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ternational law, its judgment actually stands as a more nu-
anced example of an early international criminal law tribunal 
having actually made use of general principles.184 
More recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have both made relatively extensive 
use of general principles.185  They have also embraced this 
source of law quite openly, with one decision going so far say as 
to explain as follows: 
[t]he value of these sources is that they may disclose ‘general 
concepts and legal institutions’ which, if common to a broad spec-
trum of national legal systems, disclose an international ap-
proach to a legal question which may be considered as an appro-
priate indicator of the international law on the subject.  In 
considering these national legal systems the Trial Chamber does 
not conduct a survey of the major legal systems of the world in 
order to identify a specific legal provision which is adopted by a 
majority of legal systems but to consider, from an examination of 
national systems generally, whether it is possible to identify cer-
tain basic principles.186 
 
At a simple level, these international criminal law tribu-
nals have identified general principles pertaining to procedural 
and evidentiary rules,187 including res judicata,188 audi alteram 
partem,189 in dubio pro reo,190 and iuria novit curia.191  Some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184  Cf. id. at 81-83 (discussing the use of general principles by the Tokyo 
Tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)). 
185  See e.g. id. at 86 (noting at least eighteen ICTY judgments making 
use of general principles) and passim. 
186  Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 439 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). 
187  SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 
162, at 105-106. 
188  Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision 
(Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration),(Mar. 31, 2000) (Decla-
ration of Judge Nieto-Navia).  
189  Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A0, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l. 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Jul. 5, 2001) (Separate opinion of 
Judge Nieto-Navia). 
190  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 319 
(Sept. 2, 1998) (accepting, in the instance of doubt, the version of facts more 
favourable to the accused).  See also, Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-
T, Judgment, ¶ 416 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Jul. 31, 
2003) (accepting same principle in ICTY).  See also Prosecutor v. Delalić et 
al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 599-604 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
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general principles may of course have a different meaning in 
the international context than might be thought based on any 
simple transposition of the principle’s meaning in the domestic 
context, as the ICTY found in the instance of guarantees that 
criminal courts be established by law.192  Thus, one particular 
challenge that arises in relation to appropriate transposition 
from national legal orders to the international sphere may be 
particularly important in some respects in the context of cer-
tain procedural norms.193  
The Tribunals have also used general principles to identify 
an inherent power on the part of the tribunal to punish for an 
offence of contempt.194  The contempt example has given rise to 
criticism of the Tribunals, however, as not always being en-
gaged with a consistent test for the abstraction of general prin-
ciples from national law so much as developing principles that 
suit the needs of the Tribunal.195  Such a danger seems particu-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (accepting general principle of burden of 
proof on prosecutor). 
191  Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No.ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 96-
98 (Oct. 19, 2000) (holding that arguments of parties do not exhaust what 
court can consider).   
192  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-R72, Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 41-43 (Int’l. 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (differentiating between 
the widespread national guarantee of courts being established by law and the 
mechanisms by which an international criminal law tribunal could be appro-
priately constituted).  But see, James Crawford, The Drafting of the Rome 
Statute, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 129-33 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003) (challenging the prob-
lematic dimensions of the appearance that the international tribunal has said 
that it is subject to a lower standard in this respect than a domestic criminal 
court). 
193  See generally RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 92-93 
(suggesting that there may be a need for adaptation of procedural norms);  
Cf. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 11 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (Separate opinion of Judge Sidwa) (Judge 
Sidwa referring to borrowing ideas from national jurisdictions in a flexible 
manner so as to avoid rigidities of procedures). 
194 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgment 
on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2001) (contempt of Tribunal punish-
able based on general principles of law). 
195  See Raimondo, General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity, and the 
Development of International Criminal Law, supra note 163 (noting that civil 
law systems accept existence of the contempt power only where it has been 
specifically created by legislation); see James Cockayne, Commentary, in 4 
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larly apt to arise in the context of matters that do somehow af-
fect the procedure of the international tribunal or court at is-
sue. 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY engaged in a very fa-
mous discussion of general principles in the context of its close-
ly divided three-to-two decision on the matter of duress in the 
Erdemović decision.196  The Appeals Chamber split over wheth-
er duress can be a complete defense to offenses of crimes 
against humanity or war crimes, with the question being relat-
ed to whether duress can be a complete defense against an of-
fence of killing innocent persons.  The case presents a thought-
ful engagement with general principles.197  The majority held 
that it was not but could, in the circumstances, go only to miti-
gation of sentence.  In rejecting the asserted defense, the joint 
opinion within the majority of Judges McDonald and Vohrah 
purported to canvass thirty different national criminal law sys-
tems, although presenting their attempt modestly,198 and to 
conclude that there was no general principle making duress a 
complete defense in these circumstances.  Judge Li, sharing 
their opinion on this point, summarized the effects of this sur-
vey most succinctly: “National laws and practices of various 
States on this question are also divergent, so that no general 
practice of law recognised by civilised nations can be deduced 
from them.”199   
One of the present Article’s authors has observed tenden-
cies in the decision that “although containing seemingly exten-
sive doctrinal surveys and some normative discussion, could 
prompt relatively primordial worries about the methodology of 
modes of generation of norms of international law”.200  Specifi-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1999–2000 191, 193 
(André Klip & Göran Sluiter eds., 2002) (raising similar concerns). 
196  See Erdemović, supra note 171. 
197  See Id.; Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, at ¶¶ 56-58 (pre-
senting several of the key considerations on questions of how to use general 
principles, and engaging with some of the leading decisions to have done so). 
198  Id., at ¶ 57  (“In order to arrive at a general principle relating to du-
ress, we have undertaken a limited survey of the treatment of duress in the 
world.s legal systems. This survey is necessarily modest in its undertaking 
and is not a thorough comparative analysis.”) 
199 See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, supra note 171 at ¶ 3. (Separate and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li). 
200  Dwight Newman, Theorizing Duress and Necessity in International 
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cally, the approach to analyzing national law does not take ac-
count of all factors that domestic lawyers would consider, for 
example, the discussion of Canadian law amounts only to a 
statutory reference at a time when there were already serious 
questions about the constitutionality of that statutory provi-
sion.201  A more complete examination of the national law of all 
the states involved might yield other surprises—that is simply 
unknown.  The attempt to use around thirty states’ criminal 
law provisions, to generate a general principle, risks depth of 
research in ways that, at least raise some questions about in-
ternational criminal law’s use of general principles.  
Apart from this quibble, however, Judge Cassese promi-
nently dissented in the case on different grounds altogether 
and held that duress could potentially be a complete defence in 
the circumstances of the case, subject to further facts to be ana-
lyzed in the Trial Chamber.202 The principal reason for reach-
ing this different outcome was, in one sense, that Judge 
Cassese considered that Judges McDonald and Vohrah were 
mistaken in concluding that the absence of a special rule on 
duress in the context of killing innocent persons meant that no 
rule applied to those circumstances, with Judge Cassese hold-
ing that the absence of a special rule would mean simply that 
the general rule for duress applied.203  However, his readiness 
to go this route also involved a refusal to go the route of exam-
ining national law in search of a general principle on the mat-
ter, at least except in so far as certain national judgments were 
within the sphere of international criminal law per se.   
Thus, perhaps somewhat less fully noticed by those ex-
pounding the role of general principles in international law,204 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Criminal Law, in RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: NEW CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DOMESTIC, TRANSNATIONAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 291, 294-95 (François Tanguay-Renaud & 
James Stribopoulos eds., 2012) (discussing the Tribunal’s apparent misinter-
pretation of constitutionally valid Canadian law on duress). 
201 See Id. 
202 See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dis-
senting Opinion of Judge Cassese, supra note 171 at ¶ 50. 
203 See id. at ¶ 11. 
204 See, e.g., RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64 at 100-103 
(discussing the Erdemović opinion as an example of the use of general princi-
ples without even referencing Judge Cassese’s dissent in the first instance).  
But see id. at 185-86 (offering brief reference to Judge Cassese’s critiques, 
although tending to minimize them to some extent). 
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Judge Cassese’s significant opinion actually contains a strong 
critique of the use of general principles in the international 
criminal law context.205  His opinion may be even more signifi-
cant than the majority’s in some respects in that his substan-
tive outcome on the defence of duress was actually chosen by 
states in the drafting of the Rome Statute.206  In terms of gen-
eral principles, at the very outset of his judgment, he hints at 
the use of general principles being highly problematic in the 
context of the very different body of international criminal law:  
To my mind notions, legal constructs and terms of art upheld in 
national law should not be automatically applied at the interna-
tional level. They cannot be mechanically imported into interna-
tional criminal proceedings. The International Tribunal, being an 
international body based on the law of nations, must first of all 
look to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of its 
Statute and Rules.207        
Judge Cassese is actually quite skeptical of the use of na-
tional law within international law,208 noting the autonomy of 
international law even where there have been past connections, 
saying that the “historical spilling over from one set of legal 
systems into the law of nations does not detract from these le-
gal systems (those of States on the one side, and international 
law, on the other) being radically different: their structure is 
different, their subjects are different, as are their sources and 
enforcement mechanisms.”209  His argument for this claim is in 
part specific to international criminal law and its unique fusion 
of adversarial and inquisitorial systems of criminal law, which 
has now become an entirely different system of criminal law.210  
The international criminal law system also has a very different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, supra note 202 at ¶¶ 1-6. 
206 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90, entered into force July 1, 2002, art 31(1)(d) [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
See SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, su-
pra note 168 at 90-91 (suggesting that states entrenched Judge Cassese’s 
opinion); see Newman, Theorizing Duress and Necessity in International 
Criminal Law, supra note 200 at 306 (making similar claim). 
207  See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, supra note 171 at ¶ 2 (Separate and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese).  
208  Id. at ¶ 3 (“Whenever reference to national law is not commanded ex-
pressly, or imposed by necessary implication, resort to national legislation is 
not warranted.”) 
209 Id. 
210 See Id. at ¶ 4. 
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ability to enforce its judgments, again leading to strong claims 
of its specificity.211  He does not ultimately preclude all possible 
reference to general principles but does indicate that any such 
use must be carefully tested against the autonomy of the inter-
national criminal law system and its unique characteristics,212 
implicitly in a much more rigorous manner than the majority 
had.  Thus, the ICTY has indeed used general principles in ar-
ticulating the requirements for a possibly under defined de-
fense.  But, its doing so also faced meaningful opposition within 
the Tribunal itself, as well as other problems that have been 
noticed in terms of the methodology.213 
Finally, the Tribunals have made use of general principles, 
as well, in the actual application of substantive rules of inter-
national criminal law.  For example, in the absence of a statu-
tory or customary international law definition of rape and clear 
indication on whether the offense applied in the instance of 
forced oral penetration, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija 
turned to “principles of criminal law common to the major legal 
systems of the world”, or general principles of international 
law.214  In doing so, however, it also sought to look to the values 
behind the national legal systems and thus to arrive at a gen-
eral principle that was different from the technical rules within 
the national legal systems but that reflected their shared con-
cern for human dignity, thus recognizing the offence as rape.215  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Id. at ¶ 5 (“The philosophy behind all national criminal proceedings , 
whether they take a common-law or a civil law approach, is unique to those 
proceedings and stems from the fact that national courts operate in a context 
where the three fundamental functions (law-making, adjudication and law 
enforcement) are discharged by central organs partaking of the State’s direct 
authority over individuals. That logic cannot be simply transposed onto the 
international level: there, a different logic imposed by the different position 
and role of courts must perforce inspire and govern international criminal 
proceedings.”) 
212  See Id. at ¶ 6. 
213  See, e.g., Newman, Theorizing Duress and Necessity in International 
Criminal Law, supra note 200 at 294-95 (concerning misinterpretations of 
some of the national law cited).  See generally, RAIMONDO, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 64 at 181 (discussing general lack of methodology), 
182 (discussing tendency to leave out consideration of national laws from Lat-
in America, Africa, and Asia). 
214  Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-7/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 177 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
215  See id. at ¶¶ 183-85.  See also Kunarac, supra note 186 at ¶¶ 438-442 
(using general principles to expound upon and expand some aspects of way in 
which consent requirement stated, considering broader value in national le-
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The result, of course, may be commendable, but it does repre-
sent a departure from more consistent technical approaches to 
general principles, again manifesting the complexity of the Tri-
bunals’ use of general principles. 
The Tribunals did often engage in a sort of comparative 
law research to come up with their general principles216—thus 
following the “domestic” conception of elsewhere in this Arti-
cle217— even if subject to critiques for occasional inaccuracies218 
or incompleteness.219  However, whether that represents a con-
sistent “domestic” methodology for general principles is open to 
significant doubt.  First, there are just some uncertainties on 
what was going on in some cases.  In some instances, the Tri-
bunal actually seems simply to have swapped language be-
tween customary international law and general principles.220  
Second, more general comments on the Tribunal experience 
have raised some larger questions.  Thinking of the Tribunal 
experience, some scholars have wondered if the use of general 
principles was meant simply to permit the development of cus-
tom via opinio juris alone221—although one could arguably 
more easily make the opposite claim that the cases using gen-
eral principles have actually looked at state practice alone, alt-
hough perhaps not in a manner actually different than would 
normally be part of the customary international law test.  
Third, some of the cases certainly show judges who precisely 
eschewed any “domestic” methodology and clearly sought to fol-
low some form of more hybrid methodology.222  The Tribunal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
gal systems of sexual autonomy). 
216  See generally, RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64 at 196. 
217  See RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64 at Part II. 
218  See e.g., Newman, Theorizing Duress and Necessity in International 
Criminal Law, supra note 200. 
219  See e.g., Raimando, General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity, 
and the Development of International Criminal Law, supra note 161 (discuss-
ing instances such as one in which the Tribunal used just one national law so 
as to demonstrate the purported existence of a general principle);  see also 
RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64 at 155, 157, 182, 196 (discuss-
ing failure to use national laws of large parts of the world). 
220  See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 535-539 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); see also RAIMONDO, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64 at 99-100. 
221  See KAI AMBOS, LA PARTE GENERAL DEL DERECHO PENAL 
INTERNACIONAL: BASES PARA UNA ELABORACIÓN DOGMÁTICA 35 (2005), in 
RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 167. 
222  See discussion supra Part II. 
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experience is one of mixed methodologies on general principles, 
perhaps leading to some of the later calls for constraints on 
general principles in international criminal law. 
 C. General Principles in Future International Criminal 
Law: Restraints on the ICC 
The Rome Statute223 establishing the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) actually carefully regulates the sources of law 
to which the ICC may have reference.224  This careful delimita-
tion of sources arose along with other efforts to limit the discre-
tion of the ICC.225  In relation to general principles, the ICC is 
empowered by article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute in quite spe-
cific terms to use them, but subject to various constraints that 
become clearer from the full text of article 21(1): 
The Court shall apply:  
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties 
and the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as ap-
propriate, the national laws of States that would normally exer-
cise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are 
not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards.226  
Some have seen article 21(1)(c) as simply a modern state-
ment of the concept of general principles, breaking from the 
now less acceptable “civilized nations”227 language in article 
38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.228  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223  See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. 
224  See SCHABAS, supra note 168, at 195 (stating that “[t]he Rome Statute 
creates a special regime as far as sources of law are concerned.”). 
225  Id., at 194 (stating that “[the Rome Statute] seeks to delimit in great 
detail any possible exercise of judicial discretion.”) 
226  ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art 21(1)(c). 
227  See Boas, supra note 13, at 105 (suggesting that this language is now 
obsolete). 
228  See SCHABAS, supra note 168, at 102 (stating that “The language [of 
38(1)(c)] is archaic, and a more acceptable and contemporary formulation of 
essentially the same concept appears in article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute”).  
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However, the reality is more complex.  First of all, the opening 
words, “Failing that”, establish general principles as clearly 
subsidiary to the other sources of the Statute and associated 
instruments as well as custom concerning the international law 
of armed conflict.229  Second, the terminology of article 21(1)(c) 
of the Rome Statute is arguably not even entirely internally 
consistent.230  It both commands the creation of general princi-
ples from national laws generally and gives some special au-
thority to the national laws that would normally govern the 
matter.231  Moreover, some have taken the article as evolutive, 
since a later reference within article 21(3) to a rule that “[t]he 
application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article 
must be consistent with internationally recognized human 
rights”232 means that its meaning can shift with future changes 
in international human rights norms.233 
Apart from the relationship to national legal systems im-
plied in the general principles context, it bears noting that the 
ICC’s relationship to national legal systems is more complex 
and more specifically defined in certain contexts.  Aside from 
the general jurisdictional principles of complementarity that 
define a certain relation to national legal systems more gener-
ally,234 there are some contexts where the Rome Statute actual-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229  See also, RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 150-51. 
230 See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, 
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189, 215 (Roy Lee ed., 1999) (stating that “[t]here is 
of course a certain contradiction between the idea of deriving general princi-
ples, which indicates that this process could take place before a particular 
case is adjudicated, and that of looking also to particular national laws of rel-
evance to a certain case; but that price had to be paid in order to reach a 
compromise.”); See also RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 
150 (referring to “the peculiar wording employed by the drafters of the Stat-
ute.”) 
231  Id. 
232  ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 21(3). 
233  See SCHABAS, supra note 168, at 198 (same author who stated that 
the article just restates general principles idea also stating that “the Statute 
is not locked into the prevailing values at the time of its adoption.  Interna-
tional human rights law continues to evolve inexorably, and the reference to 
it in the Statute is full of promise for innovative interpretation in future 
years.”).  
234  See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 17(1) 
(stating that “[h]aving regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, 
the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, un-
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ly textually overrides local approaches.235  For example, on lim-
itation periods, article 29 states simply as follows: “The crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any 
statute of limitations.”236  This provision actually limits the 
principle of complementarity in a certain sense in so far as it 
precludes national legal systems from having certain sorts of 
limitation periods or at least from seeing those limitation peri-
ods have effect.237 
The Rome Statute thus quite specifically defines the rela-
tion to national legal systems.  And, in any event, article 21 is 
clearly meant to guide the International Criminal Court rather 
specifically in terms of its sources.  As has been stated by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, “the rules and practice of other 
jurisdictions, whether national or international, are not as such 
‘applicable law’ before the Court beyond the scope of article 21 
of the Statute.  More specifically, the law and practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals, which the Prosecutor refers to, cannot per se 
form a sufficient basis for importing into the Court’s procedural 
framework remedies other than those enshrined in the Stat-
ute.”238  Given this sort of analysis, article 21(1)(c) presumably 
falls to be read relatively strictly.  One result could arguably be 
a narrow reading of general principles recognized by the Stat-
ute, especially given its allocation of general principles to a 
subsidiary position in terms of sources of applicable law.239 
The detail of the Rome Statute generally, along with the 
existence of more customary international criminal law, as de-
veloped by the Tribunals,240 means that significant lex specialis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
less the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution [...]”). 
235  See SCHABAS, supra note 168, at 234. 
236  ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 29. 
237  Cf. SCHABAS, note 168, at 234 (“Article 29’s role in the Statute would 
appear to be part of the complex relationship between national and interna-
tional judicial systems.  It acts as a bar to States who might refuse to surren-
der offenders on the ground that the offence was time-barred under national 
legislation.  More than that, Article 29 may effect the prohibition on statutory 
limitation that the international treaties have failed to do.”). 
238  Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Position on the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to Redact Fac-
tual Descriptions of Crimes from the Warrant of Arrest, Motion for Reconsid-
eration, and Motion for Clarification, ¶ 19 (Oct. 28, 2005). 
239  See also RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 150-51 
(suggesting that the language of the text implies this subsidiarity). 
240  Cf. e.g. Noora Arajärvi, The Role of the International Criminal Judge 
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exists so as to imply that a subsidiary source such as general 
principles likely should not make a frequent contribution at the 
ICC.241  States have chosen to constrain the ICC’s use of gen-
eral principles, perhaps in part reacting against the experience 
of the Tribunals’ less constrained law-making.  On this read-
ing, general principles may have had a historically temporary 
role within international criminal law, allowing for its rapid 
development during an era of need but now giving way to other 
sources of international law. 
However, a resurgence in the use of general principles is 
potentially difficult to block, even with specific textual wording.  
Even in some of its earliest decisions, there were already sev-
eral instances in which the ICC in fact went on to use general 
principles, largely on procedural issues, such as rules on “wit-
ness proofing,”242 extraordinary leave to appeal,243 burden of 
proof on victim participation and use of circumstantial evidence 
in such applications,244 and contact and communication be-
tween witnesses.245    
With that said, some judgments have specifically drawn 
upon the text of the Statute to discuss reasons for restraint in 
applying general principles. For example, a recent separate 
opinion in Trial Chamber I’s judgment in the Lubanga case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in the Formation of Customary International Law, 1 EUR. J. LEG. ST. No. 2, 
2007, at 1 (reviewing general interaction of ICTY and customary internation-
al law, including development of customary international law in different 
ways during different phases of the ICTY’s operations); Leila Nadya Sadat, 
Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 336 
(2013) (noting role of tribunals in development of customary international 
law). 
241  Cf. Raimando, supra note 163. 
242  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, ¶¶ 35-37 (Nov. 8, 
2006). 
243  See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-
01/04, Appeals Chamber Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Ex-
traordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Deny-
ing Leave to Appeal, ¶¶ 3, 5, 22 (Jul, 13, 2006). 
244 See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Domi-
nic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on Vic-
tims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, 
a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ¶¶ 13-15 (Aug. 10, 2007). 
245 See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber Decision Revoking the Prohibition of 
Contact and Communication Between Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, ¶12 (Mar. 13, 2008).  
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warns to some extent against the use of general principles.246  
Piercing behind an approach to co-perpetration adopted by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber based on some fragments of ICTY case law, 
Judge Fulford identified this approach as actually having come 
into the ICTY directly from German law.  Then he wrote:  
While Article 21(1)(c) of the Statute permits the Court to draw 
upon “general principles of law” derived from national legal sys-
tems, in my view before taking this step, a Chamber should un-
dertake a careful assessment as to whether the policy considera-
tions underlying the domestic legal doctrine are applicable at this 
Court, and it should investigate the doctrine’s compatibility with 
the Rome Statute framework. This applies regardless of whether 
the domestic and the ICC provisions mirror each other in their 
formulation. It would be dangerous to apply a national statutory 
interpretation simply because of similarities of language, given 
the overall context is likely to be significantly different.247 
The statement, part of a decision not to affirm the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s approach, is in one sense a statement about 
caution in transposition of general principles from domestic 
contexts into the international sphere, with some wise counsel 
on the possible use of the overall policy frameworks as a way of 
analyzing when it is and is not appropriate to transpose princi-
ples.  That analysis sits squarely within what this Article has 
called the “domestic” methodology, with cautious restraints on 
its application.  However, at the same time, the paragraph is in 
fact affirming of the use of general principles, with the identi-
fied means of restraint being one generated from a type of poli-
cy consideration rather than being based directly on the text of 
Article 21(1)(c) of the Statute, thus actually portending future 
flexibility even from an instance of current restraint.  Even 
with strong textual restraints, general principles come into use 
at the ICC, with judges having obviously been drawn to them 
in particular cases in light of certain needs of the international 
criminal law system.  Their future use may be restrained, or it 
may not be. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
2842, Judgment, ¶ 10 (Mar. 14, 2012) (separate opinion of Judge Adrian Ful-
ford). 
247  Id. 
51
2014] A CONTEXTUALIZED ACCOUNT  337 
VI. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS  
The international law status of Indigenous rights is still 
developing,248 and Indigenous rights remains seen by many 
scholars as a relatively exotic area of international law.  The 
General Assembly’s 2007 adoption of the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples249 is a significant step, but it by 
no means resolves all questions, and, indeed, there are ongoing 
debates about to what extent its provisions reflect customary 
international law.250  When much of the effort in relation to In-
digenous rights is to reform past approaches seen as flawed, it 
would be somewhat surprising if customary international law 
already corresponded entirely to the sought reforms.   
Pertinent case law on Indigenous rights in general inter-
national law is similarly relatively limited.  There are, to be 
sure, numerous decisions based on particular treaty norms, 
most of this case law under ILO Convention No. 169251 in vari-
ous Latin American domestic courts,252 or under that instru-
ment along with the Inter-American human rights instru-
ment253 in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.254  
There has also been a significant decision under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights255 in the African Com-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248  See e.g., James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2d 
ed., 2004); Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations 
Standards: Self-Determination, Culture, and Land (2007); Reflections on the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Stephen Allen & Alex-
andra Xanthaki eds., 2011).  
249  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 7, 2007). 
250  See Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, supra note 248 (several chapters addressing this point). 
251  Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independ-
ent Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 (entered into force Sept. 
5, 1991). 
252  See e.g., Christian Courtis, Notes on the Implementation by Latin 
American Courts of the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous Peoples, 10 Sur-
Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 53 (June 2009) (reviewing various domestic decisions, espe-
cially around issues of prior consultation). 
253 See e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).  
254 See generally, Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Evolution of International In-
digenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 6 Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 281, 283-84 (2006) (reviewing some of the developing Indigenous rights 
jurisprudence in the Inter-American Court). 
255 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 
1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/8
338 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
mission on Human Rights.256  Particular United Nations re-
porting mechanisms have also rendered decisions based on par-
ticular international treaties, such as under the Convention on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.257   But, there have 
been very few pronouncements on general customary interna-
tional law on rights of indigenous peoples, although both schol-
ars and international law bodies have argued for such norms of 
customary international law.258  
One case that appeared about to be a leading exception to 
this proposition was the recent decision of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in the case of the Kichwa Indigenous 
People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador.259  This case arose from the li-
censing of oil development in the Sarayaku region without ade-
quate prior consultation with the Indigenous people of the re-
gion whom might be affected by the decision—along with other 
claims such as allegations of uses of force against members of 
that Indigenous people.  The Court began with a more tradi-
tional sourcing of rules on consultation in ILO Convention No. 
169.260  However, it then began engaging with national law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Oct. 21, 1986). 
256 Center for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group In-
ternational on behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council vs. Kenya, African Court for Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, African Comm’n H.P.R., Com. No. 276/2003 (2009) 
[hereinafter, Endorois Welfare Council vs. Kenya]. 
257 See e.g., U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
[CERD], Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1(68), Intro-
duction, (Mar. 10, 2006) (adjudicating aspects of the Dann claim based on In-
ternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. 
A/6014, at 47 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), avail-
able at http://www.indianlaw.org/sites/default/files/WS%20CERD 
%20Decision%202006-03_0.pdf. 
258  See e.g., ANAYA, supra note 248 (arguing for various customary inter-
national law norms); International Law Association, Sofia Conference, Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, Final Report (2012) available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024. 
259 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 242 (June 27, 2012) available at 
http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf. 
260 Id. at ¶ 160 (stating that “[b]ased on all of the above, one of the fun-
damental guarantees to ensure the participation of indigenous peoples and 
communities in decisions regarding measures that affect their rights and, in 
particular , their right to communal property, is precisely the recognition of 
their right to consultation, which is established in ILO Convention No. 169, 
and other complementary international instruments.”). 
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from not only signatory states261 but also non-signatory states 
as well.262  At the end of a paragraph filled with extensive cita-
tion to different national legal provisions—a mix of constitu-
tional provisions, legislative provisions, and judicial decisions—
the Inter-American Court ends up stating that “[i]n other 
words, the obligation to consult, in addition to being a treaty-
based provision, is also a general principle of international 
law.”263 
This identification of a general principle in the area of In-
digenous rights could, on the one hand, have major significance 
as a precedential approach of sorts that allows for the incorpo-
ration of Indigenous rights into international law without the 
need to meet the strict standards of customary international 
law—even if some have been working precisely at that.264  The 
approach used by the Court in the case is, in the terminology of 
the present Article, a “domestic” methodology, at least on the 
surface.  However, several challenges and complexities seem 
apt to arise, with this particular decision, as a unique one in 
this area, permitting a close consideration of them that will 
help draw together several different themes from this Article. 
First, the methodology reflected within the Inter-American 
Court’s reasoning in Sarayaku is surely more hybridized than 
it first appears.  The operative paragraph at the end of which 
the general principle emerges, almost by surprise, in the last 
sentences actually begins with two overlapping lists of a dozen 
treaty signatories that have enacted legislation or had judicial 
decisions on the obligation of consultation,265 but their national 
laws are presumably, in many respects, motivated by their 
treaty obligations.  Then, the Court goes on to mention the na-
tional laws of only three other states—the not especially widely 
differing examples of Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
States—as examples of non-party states that have recognized 
this obligation of consultation.266  If the methodology were sole-
ly founded on the “domestic approach”,267 more evidence would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Id. at ¶ 164. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264  See e.g., International Law Association, Sofia Conference, supra note 
258 (very rigorous analysis of customary international law in this area). 
265  Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, supra note 259, at para. 164. 
266  Id.  
267  See supra Part II. 
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surely be appropriate.  A more honest interpretation of the ap-
proach would see the Inter-American Court as engaged in a 
hybridized approach to the identification of the general princi-
ple at issue. 
Second, the passage at issue is a further demonstration of 
how the domestic methodology faces major challenges in appli-
cation.  With respect, on some of the states referenced, the 
Court’s interpretation of certain elements of national law is 
more innovative than it presents itself as being.268  Where a 
Court sees a principle as something that should be within the 
international order, the temptation of course becomes to utilize 
national law in ways that can support an argument to turn it 
into a general principle.  But a less than precise application of 
this methodology threatens the legitimacy of the international 
law system in so far as it leaves decisions not well supported by 
the legal materials they cite, which will always leave questions 
about the legitimacy of the decisions. 
Third, the relation between general principles and custom-
ary international law remains complex and confusing.  If one 
follows the domestic methodology for general principles and 
looks essentially at what would otherwise be state practice, 
without now looking for opinio juris, have general principles 
become a route around the standard methodology for custom-
ary international law, and is that a good thing or a bad thing?  
Such a state of affairs would certainly permit the more rapid 
development of international law in areas that cannot wait for 
the usual requirements of customary international law to crys-
tallize.  But, on the other side of the ledger, it would also imply 
a certain textual redundancy in article 38 of the Statute of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268  Compare e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, supra note 259 
at ¶ 164 (stating that “[o]ther courts of countries that have not ratified ILO 
Convention No. 169 have also referred to the need to carry out prior consulta-
tions with indigenous, native or tribal communities regarding any adminis-
trative or legislative measure that directly affects them, as well as on the ex-
ploitation of natural resources in their territory. Thus, similar developments 
in case law are evident in the high courts of countries within the region, such 
as Canada...”) and DWIGHT G. NEWMAN, THE DUTY TO CONSULT: NEW 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 30-32 (2009) (leading book on con-
sultation with Indigenous peoples in Canada describing complex position on 
consultation on legislation, on which there is likely no duty to consult, mak-
ing the statement in the case possibly technically correct but having tenden-
cies to imply broader application than actually the case.).	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International Court of Justice.269  If every customary norm is 
also a general principle (simply with less evidence needed), 
then the presence of two separate branches in article 38 is un-
necessary and redundant, something ill at odds with normal 
methods of textual interpretation.  Yet, the mixed ways in 
which methodologies of general principles have developed in 
different areas of international law does not necessarily make 
the distinction easy to describe. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS 
One major claim in this Article has been that different ar-
eas of international law have different dominant methodologies 
for the identification of general principles.  For instance, Part 
III showed that international environmental law clearly follows 
a hybrid methodology, whereas Part IV showed that interna-
tional investment law clearly follows a domestic methodology.  
Such a difference shows at once that the type of contextual con-
sideration undertaken yields important descriptive insights 
concerning the formation of international law in different areas 
that may be obscured by a question for a universal, decontex-
tualized account of general principles. 
One complex issue that arises from this phenomenon is the 
question of whether general principles identified in one area, 
based on one methodology, can properly be used in another.  If 
they cannot, of course, that arguably spells increased fragmen-
tation to international law.  But if there are reasons for the 
methodology in each specialized area, there are arguments 
against any automatic migration of general principles from one 
area to another.  The possible differences reflect possible spe-
cialization of international law, in light of principles that ap-
propriately fit each area of international law.  To say that 
much does not actually encourage fragmentation per se but, ra-
ther, a more nuanced understanding of international law in 
various specialized areas that may still interact in an ultimate-
ly non-fragmented way.  But, the use of different approaches to 
principles in different specialized areas is potentially actually 
necessary to respond to the policy needs of those areas. 
Indeed, there is thus the possibility to consider that for-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269  Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, supra note 4. 
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mation of international law should be contextually differentiat-
ed.270  Different new, specialized areas of international law do 
not necessarily regulate simply the relation between states, as 
had traditional international law that could then come reason-
ably from voluntarist models.  Rather, some areas now regulate 
the relation of the state to the environment (international envi-
ronmental law), various financial relations between different 
actors (international investment law), the conduct of individu-
als themselves regulated by international law (international 
criminal law), or the relation of states to collective entities not 
recognized as states (indigenous rights).  If law must be an-
swerable to those whom it regulates, international law in these 
different areas must actually be answerable in different ways 
that could well give rise to reasons for contextual differentia-
tion in formation generally but then also in the analysis of gen-
eral principles.271 Just by way of completeness, it bears noting 
that a generalist tribunal, like the International Court of Jus-
tice, could properly follow the methodologies of specific novel 
areas when considering those areas and its traditional method-
ologies when considering traditional state-regulative interna-
tional law.  
With that said, if genuine inconsistencies emerge due to 
the differentiated approaches in different areas of international 
law, these being beyond merely different approaches in differ-
ent areas but being approaches that embody contradictions be-
tween different areas, the present account does not actually 
promote that sort of fragmentation.  Rather, an appropriate re-
sponse would be to consider whether there is an inadequate 
recognition in some areas of the actors to whom each respective 
area of international law must be answerable for the sake of 
maintaining its legitimacy.  For example, if a general principle 
developed in international investment law that was incon-
sistent with principles in areas like human rights law or envi-
ronmental law, there might be an argument that arises that 
each of these areas is incompletely understanding the scope of 
its regulatory impact and thus to whom it ought to be answer-
able to maintain its legitimacy. In other words, recognition of 
the contextual differentiation of international law may some-
times recognize appropriate differentiations and may some-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270   Cf., Newman, supra note 10.  
271  Cf., Id. 
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times point to a critique or challenge of incomplete dimensions 
of international regulatory authority.  This account thus points 
in a set of important directions. 
Part V showed particular sensitivities in relation to gen-
eral principles in the context of international criminal law and 
dangers in terms of the relation of principles of national law be-
ing situated in a different context.  While international invest-
ment law may, pursuant to Part IV, be quite open to principles 
coming from a domestic approach, international criminal law 
has sufficiently different policy considerations at play in terms 
of regulating different kinds of offences and doing so in a man-
ner that affects international relations that there may be rea-
sons for cautious restraint on the movement of national norms 
into international criminal law.  And there seems little reason 
to think that international investment law and international 
criminal law need to work exactly the same when they are spe-
cialized systems with specialized practitioners and adjudicators 
that have very little likelihood of overlap with one another.  
Whereas some areas may need to demonstrate a reasonable 
degree of conformity, such as international investment law and 
law concerning human rights impacts from business, other ar-
eas may well develop more distinctively. 
Part VI showed a recent use of general principles in the 
context of indigenous rights and, along with some of the other 
Parts, it showed challenges in the application of some of the 
methodologies, particularly purported uses of domestic meth-
odologies when systems of national law are more complicated 
than on an any simple description.  These challenges present 
reasons for very careful comparative law work in areas of in-
ternational law that use the domestic methodology either in 
full or in part.  That work is necessary to the reasons of inter-
national adjudicative bodies to retain their reputation, as a 
matter of accuracy and ultimately legitimacy.         
This contextually sensitive analysis of general principles 
has sought to contribute by identifying real contextual differ-
ences in the use of general principles, thus offering a more pre-
cise account of them than in the existing literature.  That more 
precise account then also enables the asking of further ques-
tions on the significance of these contextual differences.  The 
answers to that question are very important, and this Article 
has presented distinctive views that must enter into the broad-
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er conversation on these issues.  There must be more discus-
sions of the very significant phenomenon of general principles 
in international law, and this Article has sought to open that 
conversation in a new way that can serve as a platform for fur-
ther discussions in the future based on a sounder foundation in 
the contextualized nature of general principles.   
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